Promoting Human Rights-based Approach towards Vulnerable Groups in Detention in the Middle East and North Africa Region

Impact Evaluation

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1. Introduction

1.1 Project background

In December 2011, Penal Reform International’s (PRI) Middle East and North Africa Office (MENA) launched a three year regional project, entitled: ‘Promoting human rights-based approach towards vulnerable groups in detention in the Middle East and North Africa region’. The project is funded by the Swedish International Cooperation Development Agency (SIDA). The project has a broad geographical scope covering six countries in the MENA region: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen. Due to limitations of time and resources, this evaluation will focus on Jordan and Tunisia only.

The overall goal of the project is: to promote humane and fair treatment of vulnerable people in conflict with the law through the implementation of international human rights standards for the administration of criminal justice. The project has four specific objectives:

1) Reform prison and places of detention so they respect and protect the rights of vulnerable groups
2) Promote alternatives to imprisonment to reduce the number of vulnerable groups in detention
3) Enhance the engagement of local civil society organisations to protect and promote vulnerable groups’ rights
4) Advocate at an international level to promote human rights and compliance with international standards in the region.

Linked to these four objectives, the project has four long-term outcomes:

1) Increased knowledge and enhanced competencies of international standards for the treatment of vulnerable prisoners amongst key criminal justice system stakeholders
2) Plans and proposals for implementing alternative sanctions and diversion mechanisms at community and police level
3) Develop capacity of civil society groups to initiate projects that aim at protecting vulnerable groups in prison and promoting alternatives
4) International standards for the improvement of prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners promoted, adopted implemented as appropriate.

This evaluation will focus on outcomes 1, 2 and 3. This evaluation will focus on the extent to which these three outcomes materialised in Jordan and Tunisia. Outcome 4 is focused on PRI’s work at the international and regional level, which is beyond the scope of this evaluation. However the evaluators will look at how PRI used a regional approach – for example, transferring models of good practice from one country to another - to achieve results in Jordan and Tunisia.

The target groups of this project were prison personnel, authorities, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, police, social and probation officers, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in penal reform. The final beneficiaries of the project were people vulnerable groups in detention, including women, women with children, domestic workers, children detained with their mothers, and juveniles.

To achieve the project outcomes, PRI carried out a combination of advocacy, capacity and technical support and practical programmes of reform. Throughout the project PRI focused on promoting international human rights standards and transferred models of good practice from one MENA country to another. PRI also focused on building the capacity of national and regional civil society organisations so that they could contribute to project outcomes 1 and 2.
1.2 Country background and context

Jordan

The Syrian civil war has caused a refugee crisis in Jordan with an estimated 1.3 million Syrians migrating to Jordan’s northern border. Consequently, the level of crime has increased with the Jordanian police and judiciary calling for tougher action. Government resources have also been diverted to the refugee crisis which has caused budget problems for other Jordanian public services. However, the penitentiary system remains high on the Jordanian political agenda with above average resources (compared to other MENA countries) spent on the prison system. Approximately 1,000 JD per month is spent per prisoner and King Abdullah has allocated 50 million JD to build new prisons in Jordan (Focus group with Prison Training Department, 25 August 2014).

Jordan has a population of 6.4 million people and currently has an estimated prison population of 9,500 (Focus group discussion with Prison Training Department, 25 August 2014). There are 14 prisons in Jordan and they are known as Correction and Rehabilitation Centres (CRCs). There are also centres of temporary detention distributed among the northern, central and southern areas of the country. The Public Security Directorate has responsibility for prisons and sits within the Ministry of Interior. Jordan does not have a prison overcrowding problem: the population does not exceed the official capacity of the system. However, Jordan does have a large number of people in pre-trial or administrative detention. 50% of Jordan’s population is currently in pre-trial detention or administrative detention (Focus group with Prison Training Department, 25 August 2014).

Women make up three per cent of the total prison population in Jordan (International Centre for Prison Studies, ICPS, 2013). The number of women in prison slowly increased from 2000 to 2007 but has been relatively stable since. Nearly all women prisoners are held in the Women’s Correction and Rehabilitation Centre in Juweida on the outskirts of the capital Amman. The women’s CRC has capacity for 350 prisoners but at the time of the evaluation field visit it held 433 women. Of those 433 women: 211 were held under administrative arrest; 122 were held under pre-trial arrest; 90 were sentenced; and nine were in hospital (Evaluation field visit to Juweida CRC, 26 August 2014). The administrative detention situation in Jordan has been widely criticised. Governors can place a person under administrative arrest in order to protect them from others or from themselves. The Director of Juweida CRC noted that the administrative detention situation was a major challenge that depleted the prisons resources and caused an overcrowding situation (Interview, 26 August 2014).

There are a total of six juvenile detention facilities in Jordan. The Directorate of Social Defence (under the Ministry of Social Development) is responsible for overseeing the juvenile facilities. The post-trial detention centres are called Juvenile Rehabilitation Centres, which are often referred to as Juvenile Care Centres. For children in conflict with the law, the term ‘Care Centre’ can be misleading term and suggests a voluntary attendance. The Juvenile Care Centres in Jordan are mandatory detention centres. Table 1 shows that the number of children held in pre-trial detention has steadily decreased since 2010 and that the number of children held post-trial has sharply decreased between 2010 and 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No of juveniles - pre-trial detention</th>
<th>No of juveniles - post-trial detention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,371</td>
<td>2,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2,174</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2,346</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 until September</td>
<td>1,771</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Juvenile detention figures
(Source: Advisor for the Directorate of Social Defence, September 2013)
Tunisia

Tunisia is currently undergoing a process of transition to democracy and the criminal justice and prison system is in a state of flux and change reflecting the enormous ongoing social and political changes. Police centres and temporary detention centres are under the control of the Ministry of Interior whilst the Ministry of Justice and the Directorate General for Prisons Administration and Rehabilitation manage the prisons system which encompasses 26 prisons.

During and after the revolution in 2010/11 there were fires, escapes and unrest in several prisons resulting in at least 72 deaths (Compilation of UN information for Universal Periodic Review of Tunisia, 2012) and security in prisons remains a problem. The prison system in in Tunisia faces problems with overcrowding which was worsened by the destruction of prison buildings during the revolution. Tunisia has a total population of 10.8 million with an estimated 25,000 people in prison (ICPS, 2013). Similar to Jordan, Tunisia has a major pre-trial detention problem. In November 2013, 52 percent of prisoners were in pre-trial detention (ICPS, 2013).

An important change since the revolution is that the Tunisian Prison Department has started to allow access to prisons by civil society organisations for the first time. Tunisian civil society organisations are starting to organise a preventive monitoring process and are creating rules and procedures based on international good practice. The Prison Department now has a Memorandum of Understanding with nine national NGOs and ten international NGOs. Tunisia ratified the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) in June 2011 and nominations are being considered for members to form the National Preventative Mechanism (NPM).

Women make up 2.7 percent of the total prison population (ICPS, 2013). Around half of the prison population is held in Manouba Women’s Prison located on the outskirts of the capital Tunis. It was built in 1996 and according to the Director, has capacity for 420 prisoners. During the evaluation field visit (29 August 2014) there were 359 women prisoners at Manouba; 117 serving a sentence and 230 in pre-trial. The Prison Director noted that pre-trial detention was a major problem that was consuming their health, education and social care services (Interview, 29 August 2014).
2. Evaluation Purpose and Methodology

2.1 Evaluation design

A theory-based evaluation design (see Box 1) was used to test the programme’s theory through the links in the causal chain. In terms of method, this tendency is close to ‘process tracing’ (George and McKeown, 1985; Collier, 2011), which is defined by Aminzade (1993) as ‘theoretically explicit narratives that carefully trace and compare the sequence of events constituting the process’. These causal chains are typically represented graphically as a causal map.

Box 1: Theory-Based Evaluation

In order to explain we need theory to bridge the gap between data and interpretation of that data; and in the case of impact evaluation to bridge the gap between ‘causes’ and ‘effect’.

Theory-based evaluation is process orientated. It regards the programme as a conjunction of causes that follow a sequence. It follows a change pathway of a programme from its initiation through various causal links in a chain of implementation, until intended outcomes are reached. The process is built upon a ‘theory of change’ - a set of assumptions about how an intervention achieves its goals and under what conditions (Stern et al, 2012).

Process Tracing is a complex methodology in which a series of preparatory steps culminate in the identification, by key project stakeholders, of a set of targeted outcomes. Once these targeted outcomes are identified and clearly stated, data collection and analysis focus on determining the extent to which these targeted outcomes were realised and the importance of the project’s contribution to those outcomes. The evaluation process was as follows:

1. Analysis of project documentation generated by PRI.
2. Work with the PRI Middle East and North Africa (MENA) team to reconstruct a theory of change for the project.
3. Analysis of project activities (eg. monitoring reports)
4. Interviews with a range of external stakeholders to identify and evidence (a) what targeted outcomes actually materialised; (b) the plausible causal explanations that underpinned the targeted outcomes; (c) PRI’s contribution to the change.
5. Analysis of additional documentation (eg. relevant reports produced by other agencies) and secondary data (eg. Government statistics) to verify the qualitative data collected in step 4.
6. Drafting a final report documenting the research process and key findings.

2.2 Data collection

To gather the information necessary to carry out this evaluation, the evaluators used the following data collection methods.

1. Analysis of project information generated by PRI, which included:
   - Project planning documents;
   - First narrative report sent to SIDA to cover 1 December 2011 to 30 November 2012
   - Second narrative report sent to SIDA, 1 December 2012 to 30 November 2013
2. Review of a sample of the large number of reports, publications, and other grey material generated by external project stakeholders. This documentation included:

- Who are women prisoners? Survey results from Jordan and Tunisia (2014), PRI publication funded through the SIDA programme
- Juvenile Criminal Justice in Jordan (2013), The National Centre for Human Rights;
- Safeguarding children in detention: Independent monitoring mechanisms for children in detention in MENA (2011), PRI publication from a previous juvenile justice project funded by SIDA.

3. Semi-structured interviews and email correspondence with key PRI MENA staff (PRI MENA Regional Director and the Project Coordinator).

4. Semi-structured interviews with key informants from external project stakeholders who were in a position to offer specific validation of evidence regarding the targeted outcomes. Key informants included representatives from the following stakeholders:

   **Jordan**
   - SIDA (international partner)
   - Ministry of Social Development – Adviser of Social Development (government)
   - Sisterhood is Global Institute - Lawyer (non-governmental organisation, partner)
   - Prison Training Department – Director General (government)
   - Independent journalist (media)
   - Member of national independent inspection team (beneficiary)
   - Women’s Correction and Rehabilitation Centre in Juweida – Director (partner)
   - Reform and Rehabilitation Unit Manager / former juvenile judge (government)
   - European Union, Supporting Criminal Justice Reform in Jordan – EU Project Team Leader (international partner)
   - Social worker for Umm Lulu Correction and Rehabilitation Centre (partner)

   **Tunisia**
   - Prison Department – Director (government)
   - Ministry of Justice – Adviser (government)
   - Europe Rights (civil society, partner)
   - Ministry of Justice – Judge (government)
   - European Union Technical Assistance to Tunisian Ministry of Justice project (international partner)
   - Manouba Women’s Prison – Director (partner)
   - Tunisian Organisation for Penal and Security Reform – Chairman (non-governmental organisation, partner)

5. A focus group discussion (25 August 2014) with three staff members of the Jordanian Prison Training Department.

6. A field visit (26 August 2014) to Juweida Women’s Correction and Rehabilitation Centre in Jordan. A field visit (29 August 2014) to Manouba Women’s Prison in Tunisia. The field visits provided an opportunity to view the facilities and to talk informally to the Director of the prison.
3. Theory of change

Figure 1 (see next page) outlines the theory of change for the project. In consultation with PRI MENA staff, three target outcomes were identified to focus the evaluation:

- Target Outcome 1 – Increased knowledge and enhanced competencies on international standards for treatment of vulnerable prisoners amongst key criminal justice stakeholders
- Target Outcome 2 – Plans and proposals for implementing alternative sanctions and diversion measures at community and police levels are agreed
- Target Outcome 3 – Develop capacity of civil society groups to initiate projects that aim at protecting vulnerable groups in prisons and promoting alternatives

These three outcomes were chosen because they correspond to the main three strands of the project. The first outcome focused on reforming the penitentiary system to better protect vulnerable groups; the second on increasing the use of alternatives to imprisonment during sentencing; the third on developing the capacity of civil society organisations so that they can better contribute to the first two outcomes.

It should be noted that each of the MENA countries are at different stages of development with regards to the theory of change. For example, Jordan’s relatively stable political situation has enabled the Government to invest in its criminal justice system. As a result, PRI and other civil society organisations are able to constructively work with the Jordanian Government to set-up independent monitoring mechanism, alternatives to imprisonment, rehabilitation programmes and diversion for children schemes. Compared to Jordan, Tunisia is very much at an early stage of development. Through this project, PRI has therefore focused on transferring the Jordanian models of good practice to other MENA countries. For example, transferring the Jordanian specialised prison department model to Yemen; transferring the Jordanian rehabilitation pilot to Tunisia.

A detailed theory of change for each targeted outcome is presented in the next section.
Figure 1: Theory of Change for the MENA Vulnerable Groups in Detention Project

- Increased knowledge and skills of civil society actors working on penal reform issues
- Civil society actors are better equipped to provide capacity and technical support to Criminal Justice Stakeholders
- Increased capacity and improved performance of the (a) prison department; (b) independent monitoring team; (c) alternatives implementation agency
- Regular and effective independent monitoring of places of detention
- Prison systems and staff behaviour are changed in line with international standards
- Changes in penal law and policy in-line with international human rights standards (Bangkok Rules, Beijing Rules, Standard Minimum Rules, Convention against Torture)
- Increased knowledge and enhanced competencies of international standards amongst key CJ stakeholders
- Increased dialogue between civil society and Government on penal reform issues
- Increased political will of key criminal justice stakeholders to reform penitentiary system to better protect vulnerable groups and use alternatives during sentencing
- Civil society actors are better equipped to apply pressure, raise awareness (advocacy) and identify gaps in Government’s penal policy
- Increased transparency and accountability in places of detention
- Vulnerable groups in detention are treated with dignity and respect
- Rehabilitation and social services provided to prisoners before and after release
- Increased use and effective implementation of alternatives to imprisonment
- Offenders and juveniles are better able to understand their offending behaviour and develop skills
- Improved social reintegration and reduced likelihood of reoffending
- Improved conditions and protection of vulnerable groups in places of detention
- Government reviews and identify gaps in penal system
- Changes in penal law and policy in-line with international human rights standards (Bangkok Rules, Beijing Rules, Standard Minimum Rules, Convention against Torture)
4. Results of the Impact Evaluation

4.1 Target Outcome 1: Increased knowledge and enhanced competencies on international standards for treatment of vulnerable prisoners amongst key criminal justice stakeholders

As the theory of change (next page) illustrates, this outcome has three main strands:

1) Human rights approach to prison management - training and capacity support provided to the prison administrations in order to promote a human rights approach
2) Rehabilitation – rehabilitative and social services provided through an aftercare pilot to prepare prisoners for reentries and to provide support after their release
3) Independent monitoring – the establishment of an independent monitoring mechanism to monitor all places of detention

As the theory of change shows, these three strands overlap and mutually support each other to achieve the long-term impact of: (a) improved conditions and protection of vulnerable groups in detention; and (b) improved social reintegration and reduced likelihood of reoffending. Such impacts are long-term goals that will take many years to be realised in the project countries. For this evaluation, it is therefore not appropriate to assess the extent to which these impacts have been realised. The third strand, independent monitoring, will be evaluated under the third outcome (civil society).

PRI rightly focused its activities at an intermediate outcome level – increased knowledge and enhanced competencies regarding international standards and vulnerable prisoners amongst key criminal justice stakeholders. As the theory of change (next page) illustrates, this key outcome is a prerequisite for penitentiary reform, the set-up of independent monitoring and the provision of rehabilitation and social services to prisoners.

In terms of vulnerable groups, for this outcome PRI put particular emphasis on securing rights for women and children in detention. PRI focused on promoting international standards such as the UN Bangkok Rules on Women Offenders and Prisoners and the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing Rules). For example, PRI used the Bangkok Rules and other international standards as a basis for penitentiary analysis and assessment of the current legal and procedural system used by prison authorities in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Yemen (Project Narrative Report 2012-2013: 12).

Human rights approach to prison management

Out of all the project countries, during the evaluation Jordan was consistently highlighted as the most advanced country in terms of the penitentiary staff’s knowledge and competencies on international standards that promote the rights of vulnerable groups in places of detention. In Jordan, prison officers receive a high-level of training and are well paid compared to other professions in Jordan and compared to prison officers in other MENA countries. Prison officers in Jordan receive better pay and benefits than police officers because of the higher risk associated with working in prisons (focus group discussion with training department, 25 August 2014). As a result, prison officers have a high level of extrinsic motivation (behaviour driven by external rewards) to join and stay in the prison administration. The penitentiary system is high on the political agenda in Jordan and receives substantial funding from the Government budget. In Jordan 1,000 JD per month is spent on each prisoner and there is a 1:3 staff to prisoner ratio. A rights approach to service delivery is also high on the political agenda:
Figure 1: Theory of change for outcome 1
In Jordan we are committed to a human rights approach for all services. There are few reports of human rights abuses in prisons. In general, there is now a commitment to human rights in Jordan. 2007 was the turning point. Following the Human Rights Watch reports of abuse within Jordanian prisons, the King gave directions that put prisons and penal issues high on the political agenda. (Focus group discussion with Jordan Training Centre staff, 25 August 2014)

In Jordan the Correction and Rehabilitation Administration has a specialised Training and Development Centre that is responsible for training current and newly appointed prison officers. The Training Centre provides basic training for all prison staff. Once they have received their basic training, prison officers are then encouraged to take specialised courses according to their specialisation. For example, the Training Centre provides a specialised training module on prisoners and suicide (focus group discussion with training department, 25 August 2014).

During the focus group discussion with members of the Training Department, it became clear that the Department staff members are well educated, have a high level of expertise and have regional and international experience. Department staff that took part in the focus group discussion had all participated in United Nations missions all over the world, including Kosovo, Liberia and Sudan. The participants were clearly well trained and closely in touch with international standards such as the Standard Minimum Rules and the Bangkok Rules.

The Jordanian training model is being held up as a model of good practice and the Department’s expertise and curricula are in high demand at the regional and international level. At the international level, the Jordanian Training Centre has provided capacity support to the United Nations. The Training Centre is helping to develop a United Nations training curriculum for the international context, which includes topics such as the legal use of force and contingency planning. The Training Centre has also developed a handbook for the United Nations and provides training for newly appointed UN staff (focus group discussion with training department, 25 August 2014).

At the regional level, PRI are using the Jordanian Training Centre’s experience and expertise to develop and replicate a specialised Training Centre in Yemen. Through the SIDA programme, Jordanian Training staff members were used as facilitators to train and develop the capacity of the Yemen Training Centre staff. PRI’s Regional Director highlighted the establishment of the Yemen Training Centre as the most significant outcome for the SIDA programme. Through the SIDA programme, PRI also used Jordanian Training Centre staff to facilitate a human rights approach to prison management training course for the Tunisian prison administration. The Tunisian training course content included: the direct treatment of prisoners; human rights approach to administration; preparation for release and support after release. These examples demonstrate that through the SIDA programme, PRI has leveraged its regional experience and contacts in the MENA region to successfully replicate a good practice model – the Jordanian Training Centre – and transfer it to the Yemen and Tunisian context.

The Tunisian Prison Department is also trying to usher in a human rights approach to prison management. However compared to Jordan, Tunisia is very much at the early stages of the development cycle. In the post-revolution era, change is in the air in Tunisia but there are numerous challenges:

After the revolution everything changed and the Prison Department was very affected. There were so many problems involving the structure of the prisons and there were also administration problems. After the revolution, we needed a restructuring of the Prisons Department. The problems included: large number of prisoners escaped; low motivation of
prison officers; low income and services for prison officers. (Interview with Director of Tunisian Prison Department, 28 August 2014)

Such problems have had a negative psychological effect on the prison officers and have resulted in low motivation and poor productivity. Compared to Jordan, Tunisian prison officers receive a low salary and have limited access to facilities. For example, the Prison Director noted that 16 out of 28 prisons do not have kitchens for officers; 22 prisons have no common room for staff to change into their uniforms; 14 have no place for the staff to relax (Interview, 28 August 2014). Moreover, the majority of the prison officers were doing the same job pre-revolution when issues of torture and ill-treatment were commonplace in Tunisian prisons (Interview with Director of Prison Department, 28 August 2014). As a result, in general, Tunisian prison officers are more focused on security rather than the rehabilitation and human rights of prisoners. In recent years, the increase in religious extremism and the number of terrorist attacks in Tunisia, including the escape of convicted extremist prisoners, has exacerbated the tension between security on the one hand and rehabilitation on the other.

To overcome such challenges, PRI has worked closely with the Tunisian Prisons Department to help develop their capacity and to develop a coordinated strategy. Using the experience and expertise of the Jordanian Training Department, PRI has organised specialised training workshops for the Tunisian Prison Department, which has focused on developing a human rights approach to prison management. PRI has also organised several internal workshops for the Prisons Department to create a new strategy for the Department. During the interview with the Prison Director, an early draft of the new Prison’s Strategy was produced and contained a mission statement that was focused on rehabilitation and included a number of long-term, intermediate and short-term strategies to bring about the desired change. The Prison Director noted that the strategic plan was developed on the basis of the content and recommendations that were produced during the workshop that PRI organised in 2013. Moreover, the workshops and conferences organised by PRI have helped to develop a constructive dialogue between the prison management and the prison officers:

At the beginning of the project, our requests to the Prison Department [to hold a training workshop] were declined. The PRI trainings and workshops created a platform for prison staff, officers and management to engage in dialogue. In the past, they did not have this space. It was important for the officers to see their leaders talk to them about human rights. (Interview with Tunisian Organisation for Penal and Security Reform, 29 August 2014).

As a result of this increased dialogue, the Prison Department has created 10 working groups for the staff members to ensure that their voices are heard.

In Tunisia, it is clear that there is a long way to go to ensure that the prison staff and management use a human rights approach in their work and treat vulnerable groups with respect. However, there have been a number of developments to indicate that Prison’s Department is at the beginning of a reform process that is focused on human rights. With PRI’s help, the Prison Department have made significant steps to invest in the training and upgrade the facilities for prison staff. PRI has helped the Department to create a strategic plan that is focused on securing the human rights and the rehabilitation of prisoners. The wider political will to resource the reform also appears to be in place: 2.5 million euros have been reallocated from other priorities to be spent on prisons. PRI is clearly a very important partner for the Prisons Department and it is critical that beyond this programme PRI continues to support the Prison Department to operationalise their plan and to bring about sustainable change within the Prison Department to better protect vulnerable groups.
Rehabilitation after-care model

Jordan has a high-rate of recidivism with an estimated 45% of released prisoners committing a crime and being sent back to prison after their release (PRI SIDA narrative report: 23). Indeed, the European Union project – ‘Support to penitentiary institutions in Jordan’ – has highlighted rehabilitation before and after release as a key component of the Criminal Justice Strategy for the Kingdom of Jordan (2013-2018). Under the ‘Increased effectiveness of rehabilitation and punishment measures’ strategic outcome, the strategy has prioritised the following rehabilitation objectives and activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 3.3 To increase the effectiveness of pre-release rehabilitation programmes | - Evaluate the effectiveness of rehabilitation programmes for prisoners and establish plan for expansion based on evidence of what reduces further offending.  
- Develop a plan of action for expansion based on evidence  
- Develop consistent quality standards across the related activities in all institutions |
| 3.4 To establish post-care programmes for the supervision and support of offenders on release from correctional and rehabilitation centres | - To complete the development plans for enhanced supervision and support following release  
- Implementation of plans  
- To increase NGO involvement in support and training of offenders.  
- Develop a directory of NGOs who are, or can be, involved in the support and rehabilitation of offender  
- Review current rehabilitation rules and training programmes  
- Enable ex-offenders to compete in labour market. |

Table 2: Criminal Justice Strategy for Jordan (2013-2018), European Union

The European Union has agreed to spend 30 million euros on Jordan’s criminal justice system over the next five years. However, Jordan will only receive the money on condition that they meet the agreed benchmarks. For example, a reduction in reoffending is a key indicator. Consequently, the Jordanian Government has a strong financial incentive to prioritise rehabilitation schemes and alternatives to imprisonment. Under the European Union project, a small team of experts from the UK have been working closely with the Ministry of Justice to develop their capacity so that they can meet the agreed benchmarks.

In partnership with the EU project, in July 2013, PRI launched its timely rehabilitation pilot programme – ‘The Pre-Release and Post-Care Programme’. The rehabilitation model was piloted in two Jordanian prisons, one focused on women prisoners and the second focused on male prisoners. The following table provides an overview of the key variables and the results of the two pilot programmes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prison:</th>
<th>Juweideh</th>
<th>Umm Lulu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target beneficiaries:</td>
<td>Women prisoners</td>
<td>Male prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation partner:</td>
<td>Sisterhood is Global Institute (SIGI) – NGO</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Development Social Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services provided:</td>
<td>Legal, psychological, social, health and financial support before and after release</td>
<td>Legal, psychological, social, health and financial support before and after release</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of participants that received support:</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of former prisoners that have reoffended:</td>
<td>1 - pre + post release support</td>
<td>5 - pre-release support only 0 - pre + post release support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Results of the Pre-Release and Post-Care Programme in Jordan
Through trial and error, both pilot projects came to the conclusion that the following three elements are essential for successful rehabilitation:

1. Selection criteria – the following criteria were used to select participants for the programme:
   a. The offender has 2-3 months left of their sentence
   b. The offender has not committed a violent crime. The psychological and social support required to rehabilitate a violent offender were beyond the scope of the project
   c. The offender is willing to be monitored and to stay in touch with their case officer when they leave prison.
2. Services provided to prepare prisoners release – a 2-3 month programme that involves a combination of psychological, social, educational and vocational support.
3. Support provided to offenders after release – both pilot programmes found that social, psychological, vocational and financial support provided to offenders after release were key success factors for rehabilitation.

It is important to note that both projects independently came up with the same three key criteria for successful rehabilitation. The SIGI key informant noted that they had problems at the beginning of the programme because they had did not have any criteria for selecting those participants that would receive support. The Umm Lulu social worker noted that their results could be split into two distinct groups:

| Group 1: 10 offenders received services and support before release only | 50% success rate. 5 out of the 10 offenders reoffended and went back to prison |
| Group 2: 10 offenders received services and support before and after release | 100% success rate. 0 out of 10 reoffended. |

The Umm Lulu social worker noted: “I have been in the system for 15 years and I was very surprised by this result. It showed that support provided after release is very important for successful rehabilitation” (Interview, 26 August 2014). In conclusion, the social worker noted that all three elements are important and that ideally there should be one case officer that works with the offender before release and after release. The case officer can then build a strong relationship based on trust with the offender and his or her family.

In terms of the supported provided before release, both pilot programmes provided a mixture of legal, psychological and social support. In the Umm Lulu pilot, the Social Workers provided six two hour sessions of support over a 2-3 month period to prepare the offender for release. For example, psychological support included working on the offender’s family support (see case study, box 2).

**Box 2: Rehabilitation Case Study**

We worked with an offender called Omar who didn’t know how to deal with his family. We quickly discovered that Omar’s family’s expectations and attitudes towards him were a root cause of his offending behaviour. We worked with his family and persuaded them to stop blaming him and telling him about his failures. The family listened and changed their behaviour and provided positive support to Omar. It made a massive difference: Omar secured a job and did not reoffend. (Interview with Umm Lulu social worker, 26 August 2014)
During the final session of the pre-release support, the case officer reviews what has been agreed with the client and then creates a needs-based post follow-up plan that involves support from multiple agencies. The case officer is the responsible for implementing the plan. After release, the case officer usually meets one to three times per week with the client depending on their needs. The type of support provided after release includes:

- **Financial support.** PRI has set-up a Reintegration Fund, which provides long-term interest free loans to the clients after release. The clients can use the money to start their own business, pay deposit and rent to secure accommodation, pay for education and vocational training. A Steering Committee with representatives from PRI, SIGI and the Correctional and Rehabilitation Centre has been set-up to manage the spending of the fund and to followup with clients to ensure the money has been spent as agreed.

- **Practical support.** The case officer can buy practical items for the client to help with their initial re-entry. For example, they often buy clothes and pay for transport. The case officer will also help the client to secure accommodation and employment.

- **Social and psychological support.** The case officer works with the client on a one-to-one basis to help resolve their problems. For example, they can help to improve their family dynamics (see box 2), arrange for rehabilitative support for substance abuse, or organise professional counselling.

The aim of the support is to change the client’s offending behaviour and conduct. To change their behaviour, the case officers take them out of their previous environment and work with the client to build a new life (e.g. to secure a new job). This means that the client is often encouraged to sever ties with their offending past and to develop a new support network that helps to create positive energy (Interview with Umm Lulu social worker, 26 August 2014).

For the Juweideh pilot, the key informant from SIGI noted that more follow-up work and support is required to ensure that clients do not revert to their offending behaviour. With regret, the SIGI informant told the story of one women participant who participated in the programme but went on to commit a petty offence after release – she stole 18 JD – and is currently being prosecuted. The SIGI informant noted that follow-up with clients after release could have been better. A lack of capacity in terms of the number of case officers and financial resources were cited as the main reason why there was a short-fall in the support provided to the women after release. The SIGI informant noted that the Umm Lulu men’s pilot programme was more successful than the Juweideh women’s pilot because programme entry criteria were not used from the start in the Juweideh pilot. The informant noted that if she did this programme again, the criteria would be different and more comprehensive follow-up support would be provided (Interview with Layer, SIGI, 24 August 2014).

In terms of sustainability, both informants believed that without external funding, the rehabilitation pilots would not be scaled up:

> There will always be a need for external funding. The Ministry have other priorities and does not have the skills or the capacity to implement such a programme. It will take 2-5 years to create the political will required to scale up such a programme and to receive Government funding. It is better for NGOs to run rehabilitation programmes. (Interview with Layer, SIGI, 24 August 2014)

The Umm Lulu Social Worker noted that it would be good to have a National Institution for Post-Care Support and to sign an agreement with all relevant Ministries. However, he was sceptical of this happening because of a lack of political will and financial resources available. As highlighted in the beginning of this section, in order to receive 30 million euros from the European Union, the Jordanian Government needs to meet some pre-defined benchmarks and rehabilitation and
reoffending is one of the key indicators. This agreement provides a strong incentive to motivate the Jordanian Government and the relevant Ministries to set-up and scale-up rehabilitation pilot programmes that provide support to prisoners before and after release.

The Jordanian Pre-Release and Post-Care Programme is a small pilot that has had some very encouraging results. Through trial and error, it is clear that the implementers – SIGI and Umm Lulu Social Workers – have generated a number of important lessons that can be used to sharpen and improve the model. PRI can use this learning to create a Rehabilitation Model that can be transferred to other contexts. Indeed, through the SIDA project PRI has already transferred the Pre-Release and Post-Care Programme to the Tunisian context.
4.2 Target Outcome 2: Plans and proposals for implementing alternative sanctions and diversion measures at community and police levels are agreed

This outcome has two main strands. The first strand focused on the promotion of non-custodial sanctions to imprisonment (alternatives) with a particular focus on the development of community service sanctions in the targeted countries. There was a focus on increasing the use of alternatives for the mainstream prison population (adults) and for juvenile offenders (children). The second strand focused on the promotion of diversion measures for juvenile offenders which involved the establishment of a specialised police department for juveniles.

Alternatives to imprisonment

There is a limited basis for alternatives in most MENA legal systems for juveniles and adults. Alternative sanctions are therefore a new concept for the MENA region and where there is a legal basis for their use (e.g. Jordan and Tunisia), judges are reluctant to use them because there is generally no established implementation agency to oversee their implementation. Indeed, all the MENA countries are very much in the early stages of developing alternatives to imprisonment for adults and juveniles. The SIDA programme therefore focused on the relatively short-term outcomes associated with raising public awareness and building the political will to establish a legal basis for alternatives. As the theory of change (figure 2) illustrates, these outcomes need to be achieved first before organisations like PRI can focus on increasing the use of alternatives during sentencing and building the capacity of the implementing agency to ensure they are effectively enforced.

Due to the fact that non-custodial alternatives are a relatively new concept in MENA, the theory of change below (figure 3) is therefore a hypothetical analysis of how change could happen. Based on its extensive work on alternatives in other parts of the world, PRI has learnt that an alternatives theory of change should contain three main strands:

1) A change in approach towards sentencing, which includes the increased use of alternatives. This strand focuses on legislative and policy changes to enable the use of alternative sentences and the establishment of alternative programmes.

2) The effective implementation of alternative sanctions. Once an alternative sentence is passed, the sanction needs to be implemented. For example, a community service order requires the establishment of a community service programme; matching offenders to the right placements; monitoring and supervision of the cases. This often involves capacity development of the implementing agency (e.g. Probation Agency or specialised department).

3) Public support for alternatives is required for both changes in approach and the effective implementation of alternative sanctions. For example, a community service order is based on restorative justice principles where an offender offers something back to the community usually through voluntary work. To be effective this involves the support of the local community.

The focus in MENA is very much on the first strand: changing the legislation and policy so that judges can use alternative sanctions during sentencing. PRI and other actors such as the European Union, UNICEF and UNODC have very much focused on increasing political will and drafting new legislation. However, PRI has taken a long-term perspective and has also focused on creating public support for alternatives.
In terms of legislation and policy change, in the past few years there have been some significant positive developments towards the establishment of a system of alternative non-custodial measures for both adults and juveniles in Jordan. For example, a new juvenile law has been drafted and is in the final stages of approval which contains provisions for alternatives to the deprivation of liberty. Article 33 of the new juvenile law states that during sentencing an execution judge has the power to replace an imprisonment sentence (if does not exceed one year) with a community service sanction. The new juvenile law stipulates that this should be mandatory for first-time offenders. The law was drafted during the SIDA programme period and was approved by the Lower house of the Jordanian Parliament in July 2014 and is currently being reviewed by the Upper House. PRI played a
significant role in the drafting of the juvenile law and organised workshops to ensure that an article on alternatives was included:

Once the first draft of the juvenile law was written, PRI organised several workshops with criminal justice stakeholders and experts to ensure the draft was properly analysed and discussed. During the PRI workshops, we drafted recommendations with regards to alternatives and submitted them to the Juvenile Law Working Group. Our recommendations were adopted and incorporated in the final draft of the law. (Interview with Head of Correctional Unit and Former Juvenile Judge, 26 August 2014)

Drafting a new juvenile law that contains provisions for alternatives is an important achievement in its own right. However, there is an important difference between submitting a new law, the approval of that law, and the implementation of the law:

When the new juvenile law is adopted, we need to do more work with the public and judges to ensure the alternatives are accepted, used and implemented properly. We have to work with the tribes, community leaders and schools to ensure that alternatives are properly understood. There needs to be preparation work with the families of victims and perpetrators. (Interview with journalist, 25 August 2014)

When it comes to implementation, alternatives need to be customised to the Jordanian context. Jordan has a tribal culture which can encourage incidents of retribution and revenge attacks by the victim’s family on the perpetrator. At present it is not clear to what extent the community will accept community service as a fair punishment. Within this context, children and particularly girls are most at risk. Indeed, there are some concerns that alternatives may not work well for juvenile girls:

When it comes to sentencing, the use of alternatives needs to be made on a case by case basis. For example, if an offenders’ life is threatened, girls cannot protect themselves. I am concerned that the new juvenile law will not work for girls. Officials talk about juveniles; they do not recognise the needs of girls. (Interview with journalist, 25 August 2014)

To ensure that alternatives to detention work for both juvenile girls and boys, PRI is currently working with criminal justice stakeholders on the guarantees they can offer to juveniles when an alternative sentence is used. This involves working with juvenile judges to ensure that they use alternatives on a case by case basis and working with the Juvenile Police Department to ensure that for minor offences, juveniles are diverted from the court proceedings.

In the past couple of years there have also been significant developments for establishing alternatives to imprisonment for adults in Jordan. The European Union project – ‘Support to penitentiary institutions in Jordan’ – has highlighted community service as a key component of the Criminal Justice Strategy for the Kingdom of Jordan (2013-2018). Under the ‘Increased effectiveness of rehabilitation and punishment measures’ strategic outcome, the EU strategy has prioritised the following alternatives to imprisonment objectives and activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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| 3.1 To establish community sanctions as an alternative to liberty-depriving sanctions | - Develop a detailed plan and enable the implementation of community sanctions in appropriate criminal cases  
- Implementation of action plan |
| 3.2 To expand the provision of alternative detention measures related to the implementation of prison sentences | - Enable the early, temporary or conditional release of prisoners in appropriate cases, where doing so would aid rehabilitation without increasing the risk to the community |

Table 4: Criminal Justice Strategy for Jordan (2013-2018), European Union
As highlighted in the previous section, the European Union has created a number of benchmarks to incentivise the Jordanian Government to invest in and improve their criminal justice system. The increased use of non-custodial sanctions is a key indicator, which has helped to secure political will for the establishment of an alternatives system in Jordan. The EU Project Team Leader noted that establishing an alternatives system in Jordan has been a long and difficult journey but he is confident that they are finally getting there (Interview, 26 August 2014). The EU team have set up a multi-agency Working Group on alternatives and have consulted very widely. The EU carried out a 5-year baseline study, which highlighted three types of alternative sanctions that are appropriate for Jordan:

1. Community hours – unpaid work.
2. Community supervision.
3. Attendance at a programme, e.g. anger management; drugs and alcohol; driver awareness.

Importantly, the current Ministry of Justice has publicly said that he is committed to the establishment of alternatives to imprisonment system in Jordan. However, the Ministry of Justice needs to find initial start-up money to pump prime offsetting up an effective implementation mechanism. PRI and the EU team have been putting forward the economic argument that in the long-term, alternatives to imprisonment will save money for the Government: less people in prison will lead to significant economic savings.

To establish a legal basis for the use of non-custodial sentences, the EU team and PRI have worked with the Penal Code Working Group to draft changes to the penal code to ensure that alternatives are adequately included. There also needs to be changes to the Criminal Procedural Law to establish a Community Sanctions Service in Jordan. Two judges have been appointed to take it forward. Once these changes are finalised, there will be a strong legal basis for the use of alternatives in the Jordanian legal system.

Amendments to the Penal Code and Criminal Procedural Law will enable the establishment of a separate Department of Community Sanctions (referred to as the Community Sanctions Service) within the Ministry of Justice. In 2015 a number of development projects will be initiated as part of the institution building process for the new Community Sanctions Service. According to Community Sanction Strategic Business Plan, which was jointly developed by the EU and the Ministry of Justice, by 2015 the total number of staff employed within the Community Sanctions Service will be 96. If this target is achieved then it is anticipated that the range of services to be provided will be increased from 2016. A network of Community Sanctions Offices covering every governorate in Jordan will be established in the north, south and central regions, covering the main population centres. The Community Sanctions Service in Jordan will operate in a similar way to a Probation Agency and will be responsible for the implementation of community sanctions in Jordan.

If the Community Sanctions Service is established as planned within the stated timeframe, it will be a very significant step towards the increased use of non-custodial sanctions within Jordan. As the theory of change shows (figure 2), the establishment of an implementation agency is a requirement for effective implementation of community sanctions. Once a non-custodial sentence is passed (e.g. community service), the sanction needs to be implemented. A community service order will be passed from the court to the Community Sanctions Service who will then match offenders to the right placements and then monitor and supervise the case. This in turn will help to increase the number of alternative sanctions used during sentencing because judges will be more confident that the orders will be effectively implemented.

The creation of a Community Sanctions Service in Jordan will provide an opportunity for PRI to further its alternatives work in Jordan. PRI has a strong track record of working with and developing the capacity of Community Service implementing agencies. In Georgia, PRI has provided technical
support to the Georgian Probation Agency, helping them to develop an effective system for monitoring community service cases. This involved training with probation officers and the design of community service monitoring forms. In Kenya, PRI has organised a series of training for Community Service Supervisors. Using international standards and good practice, the trainings helped the Supervisors to (a) better understand their role and mandate; (b) improve their interpersonal and problem solving skills; (c) better understand the needs of vulnerable offenders, including children and women; (d) share their experience with other Supervisors. PRI can use this experience to effectively develop the capacity of Jordan’s Community Sanctions Service. This will involve a combination of technical and capacity development support.

In Tunisia, prison overcrowding is a major problem. In April 2014 a report from the UN Human Rights Office noted that it is not uncommon for Tunisian prisons to be at more than 150 percent capacity and gives as an example, Kef prison, in north-western Tunisia, where each prison guard is responsible for 76 prisoners, increasing the risk of fights and violence and reducing the likelihood that prison guards can retain control. To help solve the prison overcrowding problem, the Ministry of Justice is keen to increase the use of alternatives to imprisonment during sentencing. Tunisian legislation has already established a legal basis for the use of non-custodial sanctions: there are articles in the law that allows judges to use alternatives to imprisonment (e.g. community service or a fine) during sentencing. However the use of alternatives is low and judges are reluctant to use them:

Tunisian judges do not trust the system; they do not trust that alternative sanctions will be properly implemented. Judges need to make sure that justice is done. There is currently no system for implementing alternatives in Tunisia. (Interview with Tunisian Ministry of Justice, 28 August 2014)

In the past year, alternatives have been used on a small scale basis in Tunisia. For example, the Ministry of Justice established a community service pilot scheme in Sousse. 200 offenders were given community service orders through the Sousse pilot. Some of the offenders received placements at the court (e.g. administrative tasks) and were supervised by a judge. Others were placed in libraries or worked as cleaners and were supervised by the municipalities. Because there is no separate unit or agency responsible for implementing alternatives, a judge or the municipalities oversee their implementation. Several of the stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation noted that a separate unit within the Ministry of Justice should be established (similar to proposals in Jordan) to oversee the implementation of alternatives. However at present there is a transitional Government which doesn’t have the power to commit the budgetary resources required to establish a fully operational community service programme and the establishment of a separate agency/unit. During this transitional period, PRI has been focused on raising awareness about alternatives to imprisonment and ensuring that is high on the political agenda:

PRI’s workshops were important because they encouraged open dialogue and helped to create a community of judges. Judges are now more open to talk about important issues such as alternatives to imprisonment. PRI needs to continue this role. If PRI does not keep pushing for alternatives and creating the space to discuss them, no one will be talking about it. (Interview with Tunisian judge, 28 August 2014)

In general, most of the key informants were optimistic that when a new Government is in place an alternatives system will be established. However the responses varied on how long it would take:

The set-up of an alternatives system in Tunisia should not exceed 6 months. We already have the legislation – if it is in the law judges should use it. We do not need a pilot: a national roll out of alternatives throughout Tunisia within 6 months is realistic. (Interview with Tunisian judge, 28 August 2014)
It will take ten years to properly institutionalise alternatives to imprisonment in Tunisia. The Ministry of Justice has to go through a learning process; they need to learn how to properly implement alternatives. This is not achievable in the shortterm, it will take time. (Interview with Tunisian Organisation for Penal and Security Reform, 29 August 2014)

It is clear that like many MENA countries, Tunisia is at the start of its journey to establish the use of alternatives to imprisonment. The Ministry of Justice is keen to establish a system of alternatives and is encouraging judges to use alternatives during sentencing. Indeed, a judge noted that the Ministry of Justice circulated an internal letter encouraging judges to use alternative articles during sentencing (Interview with Tunisian judge, 28 August 2014). However the increased use of alternatives is dependent on the establishment of a separate unit which has responsibility for overseeing the implementation of community sanctions. And it is clear this will not happen until there is a fully formed Government in place. Organisations such as PRI and the Tunisian Organisation for Penal and Security Reform (PRI’s partner) should continue to create space for alternatives to be discussed and remain high on the political agenda. When a new Government is in place, PRI and other actors can then intensify their advocacy efforts and really push for the establishment of an implementing unit.

Diversion measures for juvenile offenders

In March 2011, the Department of Public Security in Jordan created a new administrative body – the Juvenile Police Department (JPD) - specialised in dealing with children in conflict with the law. The JPD was officially created on 1 January 2012 as a pilot to cover the North Amman District. The objectives of the JPD are to:

- improve police procedures dealing with juvenile offenders;
- ensure respect for human dignity and juveniles’ rights;
- encourage alternatives to incarceration, in accordance with domestic legislation, when dealing with minor offences committed by juveniles;
- partner with governmental and non-governmental institutions working with juveniles;
- consolidate partnership and collaboration with the local community;
- increase public awareness of juvenile delinquency and gain local community support for the mission of the department (http://www.juvenilepolice.psd.gov, accessed 20/10/14).

The outcome indicators associated with improved performance of the JPD are: (a) number of juveniles who are diverted from the criminal justice system; and (b) percentage of cases that are diverted. In a PRI monitoring report the following statistics are quoted:

Between 1 January 2012 and September 2012, the JPD dealt with 229 cases and 179 of those cases were solved at the police level and diverted from the criminal justice system – 78% of the total number of cases. (PRI MENA Annual Report to Dutch Ministry of Affairs, September 2011 – August 2012)

However the author of the report does not provide a source for these figures, which raises questions over the reliability of the statistics. In 2013, PRI conducted an internal evaluation of the Juvenile Police Department and the evaluator asked each of the interviewees about the Department’s diversion rates:

The department has a 70% success rate of resolving cases through mediation. (Interview with UNICEF, 8 October 2013)
600 children have been diverted from detention since the creation of the JPD. Approximately 90% of cases are diverted. Only two in every twenty cases go through the court system. (Interview with Juvenile Police Department, 9 October 2013)

Since the creation of the JPD, 70% of cases have been diverted in the North Amman region; 30% of cases have gone to court. This is a good achievement because there is no legal basis for diversion. (Interview with Rehabilitation Unit Manager, 10 October 2013)

Qualitative evidence gained through interviews with project stakeholders therefore suggests that between January 2012 and October 2013 70-90% of juvenile cases that are handled by the JPD have been diverted from the courts. Statistics to back-up this evidence were requested by the evaluator. However, despite promises from the JPD to supply this information, it was not forthcoming. To make a judgement on the significance of these figures, the evaluator attempted to find out: (a) baseline information – diversion figures in the North Amman District before the creation of the department in 2012; and (b) counterfactual information – comparison diversion figures for other Jordanian Districts. Baseline and counterfactual information were unknown. However, the UNICEF interviewee said that approximately 30% of cases are diverted from the courts in other Districts of Jordan. If this estimate is accurate, by comparison, a 70-90% diversion rate is a major achievement for the JPD and is a strong indicator of the realisation of this outcome.

In terms of increased capacity of the JPD, outcome indicators include: (a) extent to which new procedures are created and implemented; (b) percentage of staff that follow the procedures on a day-to-day basis; and (c) increased levels of knowledge and skills reported by JPD staff and partners trained by PRI on restorative approaches and conflict resolution/mediation.

The JPD has 170 staff members and since its creation several procedures have been put in place, including:

- a three-year human resource strategy (Interview with JPD, 9 October 2013);
- comprehensive training for new staff (Interview with JPD, 9 October 2013);
- an operations manual for staff that outlines a step-by-step approach (Interview with JPD, 9 October 2013);
- a Procedural Guide for Police working with Juveniles (Project annual monitoring report);
- a Code of Ethics for the JPD (Project annual monitoring report).

The operations manual and procedural guide feature a restorative justice cycle that shows each stage of the juvenile system from the child’s perspective. PRI helped the JPD to create the cycle and also produced and distributed posters of the cycle. The evaluator visited a juvenile pre-trial facility in Amman on 9 October 2013 and noticed that two posters of the cycle posters were on public display in the reception area. This demonstrates that the cycle has been widely promoted beyond the Department and is accessible to children who are in contact with the law. Taken together, these new standards and policies demonstrate that the sub-outcome – improved structures, procedures and policies of the JPD – was realised during the project timeframe. The JPD Chief Colonel noted:

> The operations manual is a step-by-step guide for staff members. New staff members use it for their first two cases to guide them through the system – it tells them what they should do at each stage. The knowledge then becomes tacit and they do not need to rely on the manual. (Interview with JPD, 9 October 2013)

The theory of change below (figure 3) illustrates a detailed theory of change of the Juvenile Police Department.
The Juvenile Police Department was established as a pilot in January 2012 to cover the North Amman District. International organisations such as Penal Reform International and local quasi-governmental organisations such as the Jordanian National Centre for Human Rights, have been advocating for the establishment of a specialised juvenile police unit. Such organisations draw upon justice for children international good practice and standards that recognise the importance of creating specialised juvenile police. For example, Rule 12 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules) notes:
In order to best fulfil their functions, police officers who frequently or exclusively deal with juveniles or who are primarily engaged in the prevention of juvenile crime shall be specially instructed and trained. In large cities, special police units should be established for that purpose. (Beijing Rules, 1989)

PRI’s ‘Ten-point plan for a fair and effective criminal justice for children’ highlights how a specialised juvenile police department is an important ingredient of a separate juvenile criminal justice system:

A separate system for all those over the age of criminal responsibility and under the age of 18 should be set up and this should be engaged from the moment of first contact until all involvement with the system is concluded. It should apply regardless of the nature of the offence and, taking resources into account, should consist of separate and specialist authorities and institutions, including separate units within police stations and separate courts, which are furnished and arranged in a child-friendly manner and staffed by specialised judges. (PRI, 2013)

The Jordanian National Centre for Human Rights published a report on juvenile criminal justice in Jordan (2013), which stated that Jordan lacked an independent criminal justice system that adhered to international standards. Despite the establishment of the pilot Juvenile Police Department in North Amman, the report specifically noted that Jordan lacks a specialised juvenile police.

The Staff Colonel of the JPD noted that the original idea for a specialised juvenile police department in Jordan came from the Family Protection Centre. The Centre had reached the conclusion that there was a need for a specialised department for juveniles that used a child-friendly restorative justice approach to focus on prevention and diversion of juveniles from the criminal justice system.

Since the establishment of the Department in January 2012, there have been concerted efforts to create a child-friendly culture that is based on restorative justice principles. This has been achieved through a parallel strategy of (a) creating procedures, policies and guidelines based on restorative justice principles; and (b) training the JPD staff and supporting agencies on restorative justice, mediation and preventative strategies. As highlighted above, several policies and procedures have been created and implemented by the Department. Such policies and procedures are extremely important for a new Department that is growing rapidly with plans to expand its scope to cover other Districts of Jordan. Indeed, the Staff Colonel of the JPD noted that he plans to open new offices for the Department in January 2014 and hopes to expand the scope of the Department to open six additional offices covering six additional regions with the long-term goal of covering the entire Kingdom of Jordan. However in order to expand there are a number of constraints and obstacles that need to be overcome:

- Financial constraints – the Department currently does not have a budget allocation to open new offices. The Department has submitted several applications to international organisations requesting financial support to pay office rent for 12 months.
- Legal constraints – there is no legal basis for a specialised juvenile police department in the current legislation. The new juvenile justice law that is currently with Parliament will address this. The Staff Colonel noted: ‘the current legislation is a major challenge for us; when the new law is approved we can expand’ (Interview, 9 October 2013). Article 10 of the draft juvenile justice law establishes a legal basis for the creation of a juvenile police department and Article 14 outlines its responsibilities.
- Turnover of staff – the Department has a highly qualified staff and has invested heavily to develop their skills and capacity. The Department therefore needs to ensure that it retains its staff and maintains a low staff turnover rate.
As the Theory of Change (figure 3) shows, policy makers, budget holders and decision makers in
the relevant Government Ministries will use evidence of the Department’s performance (eg.
diversion rates) to decide whether the Department is a successful pilot and should receive
budgetary support to expand. It is therefore important that the Department establishes a systematic
monitoring system that tracks key performance indicators such as diversion rates and number of
cases completed. As part of this evidence portfolio, the Department should also capture and
document its success stories.

The JPD has also been widely acclaimed for its mediation work. Within the JPD headquarters, there
are several meeting rooms that are dedicated to mediation. When an incident occurs, JPD officers
will attempt to call a mediation meeting that involves: the victim and his/her family; the offender and
his/her family; a Social Worker; and a Probation Officer. Several interviewees noted that mediation
is embedded in the Jordanian tribal culture: ‘it is our culture to look for resolutions’ (Interview with
JPD, 9 October 2013). For minor offences, mediation is seen as a preference for Jordanian people.
Moreover, the JPD has invested in developing its staff’s conflict resolution and negotiation skills. As
a result, the Department has been able to implement a restorative justice approach that has
successfully diverted children from the criminal justice system, which accounts for its impressive 70-
90% diversion rate.

In previous projects PRI advocated for the establishment of the Juvenile Police Department. Indeed,
during the 2013 PRI internal evaluation several interviewees noted that PRI played an important
role in establishing the Department:

PRI had a huge role in creating this Department. Taghreed (PRI MENA Regional Director)
pushed a lot with Government to create the Department and she is very good at raising the
profile and awareness of the Department with a variety of different stakeholders. (Interview
with JPD, 9 October 2013)

Building on its earlier work to help establish the Department, for this project PRI focused on
increasing the capacity and improving the performance of the department. To do this, PRI carried
out a number of activities, which were jointly funded through the SIDA programme and the Dutch
Ministry of Affairs - PRI’s Juvenile Criminal Justice System in Jordan programme:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two training workshop on interviewing skills, conflict management</td>
<td>25 participants from the JPD who actively participated in the November</td>
<td>The training increased participants’ skills on mediation and conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>and mediation (4-8 Dec 2011; 20-24 November 2012)</td>
<td>training attended the first workshop. 26 participants (7 judges, 2</td>
<td>management (evidence: project annual report and interview with former judge</td>
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<td></td>
<td>prosecutors; 11 JPD officers; 5 social workers; 1 lawyer) attended the second</td>
<td>who attended both workshops)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>workshop.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Study tour visit to the police management and juvenile departments in the</td>
<td>11 participants attended the tour, including 3 from Jordan representing</td>
<td>Based on the lessons learnt from the visit, the participants created an</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands (25-29 June 2012)</td>
<td>the JPD, Department of Public Security and Ministry of Social Development.</td>
<td>action plan to implement in their home country (evidence: annual report). It</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>is unclear whether the plans were implemented.</td>
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<td>Team of 8 experts developed procedures and guidelines for the Department</td>
<td>The team produced a guide, entitled ‘Procedural Guide for Police Working</td>
<td>Child-friendly restorative justice work procedures were adopted and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sep 11-Aug 12)</td>
<td>with Juveniles’. 500 copies of the guide were printed for the JPD. The</td>
<td>implemented by the Department, which were later fed into a staff handbook</td>
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<td></td>
<td>team also created a child-friendly cycle poster, Staff Handbook and Code</td>
<td>(evidence: annual report and interview with PRI Project Manager).</td>
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<td>of Ethics for the Department.</td>
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<td>Communications and</td>
<td>Key communications documents were</td>
<td>Clarification of JPD’s key messages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Support to the JPD (Sep 11-Aug 12)</td>
<td>Drafted, including: vision statement, mission statement and mandate. Translation and printing of promotional documents. 1,000 event packages were produced (folders, pens and brochures with JPD logo).</td>
<td>Helps to ensure the Department outwardly projects a child-friendly restorative justice image, which increases public awareness of the Department (evidence: interview with JPD Staff Colonel)</td>
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</table>

Table 5: PRI’s Juvenile Police Department Activities

The theory of change (figure 3) shows that each of these activities complemented each other to successfully achieve several outcomes related to capacity development and performance improvement. Table 3 demonstrates that PRI made a significant direct contribution to three outcomes: (a) increased public support for the JPD; (b) improved structures, procedures and policies of the JPD; (c) JPD staff and supporting agencies adopt and use a restorative justice approach. PRI therefore achieved its objective of increasing the Department’s capacity, which in turn led to improved performance of the Department and an increase in the number of children diverted from the formal criminal justice system.

It should also be noted that other NGOs and international organisations, for example UNICEF and UNODC, also made a significant contribution to developing the capacity of the Department. Such organisations provided study tours, developed publications and helped to furnish the Department’s Headquarters. Such contributions should been seen as complementary to PRI’s activities.
4.3 Target Outcome 3: Develop capacity of civil society groups to initiate projects that aim at protecting vulnerable groups in prisons and promoting alternatives

Developing the capacity of national and regional civil society organisations is a key part of PRI’s penal reform strategy. For the SIDA programme, PRI focused on developing the capacity of national non-government organisations (NGOs) so that they could better contribute to the following two outcomes:

- Establish an independent monitoring mechanism that uses established international standards to carry out regular visits to places of detention with the ultimate aim of improving conditions and protection of vulnerable groups in places of detention. For this outcome PRI focused on involving civil society organisations in the preventative monitoring process.
- Promotion of non-custodial alternatives to imprisonment with the aim of increasing the use of alternatives during sentencing and ensuring that alternative sanctions are effectively implemented.

It should be noted that from a project design perspective, developing the capacity of civil society organisations should be considered more of a project strategy (activity) than an outcome. Indeed, as the theory of change in figure 2 illustrates (page 10), the establishment of an independent monitoring mechanism would have fitted better under outcome 1: increased knowledge and enhanced competencies on international standards for the treatment of vulnerable prisoners amongst key criminal justice stakeholders. The reasons why it might have been better to include independent monitoring under outcome 1 are as follows:

- As the theory of change for outcome 1 (page 10) illustrates, the set-up of an independent monitoring mechanism is a key step towards achieving the ultimate goal of outcome 1: improved conditions and protection of vulnerable groups in places of detention
- Independent monitoring is a well-established principle in international standards (e.g. Bangkok Rules and Beijing Rules) and outcome 1 was focused on promoting and using such standards.
- PRI’s work on the independent monitoring team in Jordan is a good example of PRI’s work with civil society. However, the establishment of an independent monitoring mechanism was an impressive result in its own right. Independent monitoring therefore should have either (a) been included as a separate outcome in its own right; or (b) incorporated as a sub-outcome under outcome 1, which is a broad reform outcome.

Developing civil society’s capacity so that they can initiate projects that promote alternatives should have been incorporated under outcome 2 – the alternatives outcome – to avoid project overlap. It is clear from the civil society and alternatives theory of change (figure 5, page 35) that developing civil society’s capacity is a short-term outcome that contributes to the longer-term outcomes associated with increased use of alternatives and effective implementation. The alternatives theory of change and the civil society and alternatives theory of change are more or less identical and for future projects it would make more sense to merge them into a single outcome.

Independent monitoring

PRI successfully signed an agreement with the Ministry of Social Development to create a National Independent Team for monitoring care centres in Jordan. The independent monitoring team was officially launched on 9 March 2013. The team’s mandate includes access to all care centres in
Jordan and covers various vulnerable groups, including those for juveniles, persons with disability, elderly and orphans. It should be noted that the Team’s jurisdiction did not extend to Jordan’s prisons which have their own monitoring system.

In May 2012, a BBC documentary, ‘Jordan’s Secret Shame’, was aired in Jordan and showed shocking abuse of children with disabilities in Jordan’s care centres. The documentary caused a public uproar and King Abdullah II visited the centres in question and ordered an urgent investigation. The Investigation Committee submitted its final report and revealed additional human rights abuses. Eight of Jordan’s 54 private care centres faced allegations of abuse and three care centres for persons with disabilities were closed down (http://www.jhr.ca/blog/2013/01/a-brave-young-journalists-in-jordan/, Accessed 26 October 2014).

Prior to and after the scandal, PRI worked with the Ministry of Social Development to create the concept of an independent monitoring mechanism in Jordan. The care centre scandal created a surge of public support and political will to strengthen the monitoring of care centres in Jordan and therefore undoubtedly helped to pave the way for the creation of an independent monitoring mechanism. Taking advantage of this increase in political will, PRI developed an agreement with the Ministry of Social Development for the creation of the independent monitoring team. The agreement clarified PRI and the Ministry’s roles and responsibilities. The agreement also contained details on how the team would be financed and outlined a training schedule for the team.

On the back of this agreement, in partnership with Change Academy (a local NGO), PRI advertised and recruited 29 members for the team, 22 of which have been actively involved in team activities. The independent monitoring team’s first monitoring visit to a care centre took place on 10 July 2013. Between 10 July 2013 and 24 August 2014, the team had completed 55 monitoring visits, which is an average rate of 0.9 visits per week. To date, the team has visited all five juvenile detention centres (Interview with Advisor, Ministry of Social Development, 24 August 2014).

In Jordan there are six facilities for juvenile offenders – five centres for boys and one for girls (see Table 6). The facilities are spread across Jordan – three in Central Jordan, two in the North and one in the South.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of centre</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age range</th>
<th>Detention Stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amman centre for juveniles</td>
<td>Amman (Central)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>12-16</td>
<td>Pre-trial detention only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russeifa juvenile centre</td>
<td>Russeifa Central</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>16-18</td>
<td>Pre-trial detention only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile girls centre</td>
<td>Amman Central</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>12-18</td>
<td>Pre- and post-trial detention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid juvenile centre</td>
<td>Irbid (North)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>12-16</td>
<td>Pre- and post-trial detention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid juvenile centre</td>
<td>Irbid (North)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>16-18</td>
<td>Pre- and post-trial detention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma’an Juvenile centre</td>
<td>Ma’an (South)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>12-18</td>
<td>Pre- and post-trial detention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 6: Juvenile Detention Facilities in Jordan*

At the beginning of the project (December 2011), Jordan had three different bodies responsible for monitoring the treatment of children in detention facilities: the judiciary, the Ministry of Social Development, and the National Centre for Human Rights which is an accredited quasi-governmental National Human Rights Institute. Despite such monitoring mechanisms, Jordan lacked an independent monitoring body responsible for monitoring juvenile detention facilities in line with international standards. International standards are quite clear that independent inspections and monitoring of detention facilities by qualified bodies should take place on a regular basis, at times unannounced, with full access to the facilities, and freedom to interview children and staff in private (Sheahan and Ratrot, 2011; 12).
Figure 4: Civil society and independent monitoring theory of change

- Improved conditions and protection of vulnerable groups in places of detention
- Increased transparency and accountability in places of detention
- Government implements the recommendations in a timely manner
- A report with recommendations for action is submitted to Government
- Independent monitoring team uses the established standards to carry out regular visits to places of detention

- An independent monitoring mechanism is established
- Changes in legislation and policy to enable the set-up of an independent monitoring mechanism
- Increased political will of Government for independent monitoring
- Increased dialogue between civil society and Government on independent monitoring
- Civil society actors are better equipped to apply pressure, raise awareness (advocacy) and identify gaps in Government’s penal policy

- Adoption and implementation of standards for monitoring and inspection
- Increased knowledge and skills of independent monitoring team members
- Civil society actors coordinate to independently monitor detention facilities
- Civil society actors are better equipped to provide capacity and technical support to Criminal Justice Stakeholders
- Civil society actors provide technical and capacity support to the independent monitoring team

- Draft monitoring checklist and standards
- Increased knowledge and skills of independent monitoring team members
- Care centre abuse scandal
- Training and workshops
- Roundtables and conferences
- Research, publications

- Training and workshops for civil society
- Increased knowledge and skills of civil society actors working on penal reform issues
- National civil society actors willing to specialise on penal reform

Key: PRI contributing activities - Assumptions - External factors
The independent monitoring team’s jurisdiction allows for independent monitoring visits to all the juvenile centres presented in Table 5. The team has established a strong relationship with the Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry is acting on its recommendations. For example, the Government has created a special unit within the Ministry of Social Development to read the reports that are sent by the inspection team (Interview with Ministry of Social Development, 24 August 2014).

A team coordinator is assigned for each visit. The coordinator briefs the team members before the visit. PRI organises and funds the team’s transportation to the care centre. During the visit, the team asks to meet the beneficiaries (e.g. the juveniles) and to review their files (e.g. incident reports). The team informally advises the centre management about what they can do to rectify minor incidents of poor practice. Serious incidents of poor practice are included in the team’s report, which is submitted to the Ministry of Development within three days. For cases of abuse, the report is submitted within 24 hours. The team coordinator writes the report and sends it to PRI for review and editing. PRI then sends the report to the Minister of Social Development, who reads the report and then sends it to the inspection unit for follow-up. The Minister then sends a letter to the inspection team outlining how they intend to respond to the team’s recommendations. The team will then meet to discuss the Minister’s response and will sometimes do a follow-up visit to the centre at a later date (the Ministry has 1-month to implement the recommendations) to see if their recommendations have been implemented.

At present, the culture of detention monitoring in Jordan is very much focused on inspection, policing and punishment. The team is trying to change this culture so that it is based on learning, trust and improvement. For example, to establish trust with the care centres and the Ministry, the team does not submit its findings to the media. Moreover, PRI’s agreement with the Ministry stipulates that the Ministry has one month to read the reports and implement the recommendations. The team is focused on educating, investing and improving the performance of the centres.

Since the creation of the team, the issue of sustainability has been a constant challenge. PRI and Change Academy have done a lot of work to: create the team; raise awareness about the teams’ role and mission with the care centres, the Ministry of Social Development and the community; improve the team’s internal processes and procedures. However in many ways the team has become very dependent on PRI’s and Change Academy’s support:

From the very beginning we were aware that PRI would help set the team up and then leave. We are looking at mechanisms for sustaining the team. However, even if we get our own licence, we would like to continue to work with PRI for another two years. PRI can help us with training and to secure future funding. (Interview with independent monitoring team member, 26 August 2014)

The team have applied to the Ministry of Legal Affairs to be legally registered as a non-governmental organisation in Jordan. If the team successfully secures funding from non-governmental sources, the team will appoint a paid coordinator to do the work that PRI is currently doing. For example, the coordinator would organise the logistics of the visit, edit and proof the reports, organise capacity building workshops for the team.

Overall, it is clear that PRI has made a significant contribution to the creation and implementation of an independent monitoring mechanism in Jordan. These achievements in such a short timeframe are impressive. The team’s sustainability would be secured if it can realise its vision of becoming a registered NGO with a paid coordinator. In the meantime, PRI and other international and civil
society organisations need to continue to support the independent monitoring team to help them realise this vision.

For future projects, PRI should use its experience of establishing an independent monitoring mechanism in Jordan and transfer the model to other Middle Eastern countries. Indeed, a member of the monitoring team noted: “we hope our independent national monitoring team model can be transferred to other countries in the Middle East” (Interview with independent monitoring team member, 26 August 2014).

Since the revolution, politicians and the Prisons Department in Tunisia have become more open. In 2011 Tunisian NGOs were allowed access to prisons. The NGOs are starting to organise the process and are creating rules and procedures based on international good practice. The Prison Department now has a Memorandum of Understanding with nine national NGOs and ten international NGOs. National NGOs now have access to prisons for monitoring. PRI’s experience in Jordan, coupled with its capacity building work with national NGOs in Tunisia, puts PRI’s in a good position to capitalise on the window of opportunity to transfer the Jordan independent monitoring model to the Tunisian context.

Alternatives to imprisonment

In terms of promoting alternatives to imprisonment, the theory of change (figure 5, over page) illustrates that civil society can contribute in two ways:

- Increased dialogue with Government and civil society on alternatives with the aim of achieving legislative and policy change to enable the use of alternatives during sentencing and the establishment of a separate agency to oversee their implementation. Civil society can contribute to this process by: (a) engaging with Government in various roundtables, events and workshops; (b) participating the in penal code working group process to ensure that alternatives are included in legislation.

- Once a separate agency is established, civil society organisations can provide technical and capacity support to develop the agencies capacity and improve their performance. This could involve training of Community Service Officers to ensure they use a human rights approach in their work and providing technical support to the agency to help them develop systems and procedures to effectively monitor the orders.

The evaluators found little evidence to suggest that civil society actors – other than PRI – contributed much if at all the promotion of alternatives. In both Jordan and Tunisia it was clear that PRI itself was the main civil society organisation that organised workshops on alternatives and engagement with Government:

If PRI do not keep pushing for alternatives in Tunisia and creating space to discuss them, no one will be talking about it. PRI needs to continue this role. (Interview with Tunisian Judge, 28 August 2014)

PRI’s role on the promotion of alternatives for juveniles is very important. PRI successfully organised meetings with legislative bodies to convince them of the importance of passing the juvenile law. PRI influenced judges and changed their mind-set by organising roundtables. (Interview with Head of Jordanian Correctional Unit, 26 August 2014)

It is clear that civil society organisations participated in the alternatives workshops that were organised in Tunisia and Jordan. However, none of the key informants highlighted how other civil organisations contributed to the promotion of alternatives in Tunisia and Jordan.
Figure 5: Civil society and alternatives theory of change
PRI’s main partner in Tunisia – the Tunisian Organisation for Penal and Security Reform – believed that they had made little progress in terms of influencing the Ministry of Justice:

I personally believe that the Tunisian Ministry of Justice has not been influenced by our partnership. We didn’t sufficiently work with the Ministry of Justice. 90% of our activities were focused on the penitentiary system. Our only direct work with the MoJ was the one workshop on alternatives that targeted judges. (Interview with Tunisian Organisation for Penal and Security Reform, 29 August 2014)

As the theory of change (figure 5) illustrates, the achievement of this outcome is dependent on the assumptions that: (a) civil society actors at the national and regional level are specialised; and (b) that civil society actors coordinate and participate on alternatives. In the Tunisian context it is clear that these assumptions did not hold true. Before the revolution, there was very limited freedom of expression and association for civil society and human rights activists. Since the revolution, a large number of NGOs were created and they have increased freedom to operate and engage with Government. Civil society in Tunisia is therefore at a very early stage of development, which has a number of implications with regards to civil society’s capacity and their willingness to work together:

NGOs are starting to become more specialised in Tunisia. We have noticed a difference between 2011 and 2014. However, NGOs are still at the talking stage, they are not taking action. It is difficult to build a plan because NGOs are not used to working together in partnership. They are not ready to work together and be organised. (Interview with Europe Rights, 28 August 2014)

Back in December 2011 when the SIDA programme was initiated, Tunisian civil society was in its infancy and the vast majority of the NGOs were newly formed and working on general issues. PRI therefore did extremely well to identify and cultivate a partnership with an NGO – Tunisian Organisation for Penal and Security Reform – that specialised in penal reform. However, the fact remains that the Tunisian Organisation for Penal and Security Reform is a relatively new NGO with limited experience and capacity. For example, the NGO currently employs only one part-time coordinator and the Chairman is actively involved in organising the logistics of events. This is not an ideal scenario and it explains why PRI is the main civil society actor in Tunisia promoting alternatives to imprisonment. However, it is very important that PRI continues to work with civil society organisations in Tunisia and to continue to develop the capacity of the Tunisian Organisation for Penal and Security Reform.

PRI is currently working with Europe Rights to identify and develop partnerships with civil society organisations that are working on penal reform issues. Europe Rights is a Mediterranean human rights network that works with and develops the capacity of national NGOs. In partnership with the European Union, Europe Rights is currently implementing an 18-month project that aims to build the capacity of Tunisian NGOs. The project has four working groups on the following issues: migration; justice; gender; economic and social rights. There are 20 national NGOs per working group. PRI is currently engaging with the justice working group and using it as a platform to identify and cultivate new relationships with NGOs working on penal reform issues. This is a smart move because the working groups are effectively acting as a filter, helping PRI to identify those NGOs that have the capacity and are serious about penal reform issues.

Compared to Tunisia, Jordan has a much more developed and capable civil society. And as the independent monitoring results above demonstrate, PRI has successfully worked with Change Academy to create an independent monitoring mechanism. However, on the alternatives side, there is little evidence to suggest that there are other civil society organisations that are making a significant contribution to the promotion of alternatives. However, Jordan is the PRI MENA office
home country and PRI therefore has the capacity and the reach to work directly with Government on penal reform issues. As already noted in this evaluation, PRI has vast experience and competence with regards to promoting alternatives to imprisonment and it therefore should not be a surprise that PRI is the main civil society actor involved in the promotion of alternatives in Jordan. Indeed, if PRI was to work with with a national NGO and develop their capacity to effectively promote alternatives to imprisonment, PRI could weaken its strategic competitive advantage. It is a reality that PRI competes with other NGOs for funding. By developing the capacity of national NGOs PRI could inadvertently weaken its future funding position. In Georgia, the PRI South Caucasus office faced the same issue but overcame it by working with regional and grassroots NGOs rather than national NGOs. With regards to alternatives, the PRI South Caucasus office has worked at two distinct levels:

- National level – at the national level the PRI South Caucasus Office has focused on working with the penal code working groups to ensure that alternatives are included in legislation and policy. The team has also worked extensively with the Probation Agency to develop its capacity to effectively implement alternatives. PRI is the main NGO working at this level.
- Regional level – through a European Union project, PRI has worked at the regional level to ensure that alternatives are embedded in all regions of the country. At this level, PRI has worked with local civil society organisations to ensure that alternatives are promoted and effectively implemented by regional municipalities.

The above strategy is effective because PRI is working with local NGOs that have the capacity to reach areas of the country that PRI could not reach. Moreover, the mandate of local NGOs is very different to PRI which helps to avoid competition. With the prospect of the establishment of a separate unit for alternatives within the Ministry of Justice and the national roll-out of alternatives throughout Jordan, the PRI MENA office will be in a position to adopt a similar strategy. However, in Tunisia the situation is more complicated because PRI does not have an office and therefore does not have the same influence that it has in Jordan. Indeed during the evaluation interviews, several key informants noted that “we do not need outside expertise, we already have our own national experts”, which suggests that PRI may need to continue to work with a national NGO to promote alternatives. To do so effectively, PRI will need to overcome a number of challenges related to the fact that their main partner (a) has a lack of capacity to deliver; (b) has limited experience promoting alternatives. The obvious solution is for PRI to continue to invest in developing its partner’s capacity and transferring its knowledge and models. However, in doing so PRI needs to be aware that it could erode its competitive advantage in Tunisia and limit future funding opportunities. Indeed, this is a big challenge for all of PRI’s regional offices.

Overall, PRI has made good progress on this outcome with regards to independent monitoring but limited progress with regards to promotion of alternatives. However, it should be remembered that in Tunisia and Jordan, the development is still at a relatively early stage, and therefore PRI has not had many opportunities to involve other civil society actors in the process. For example, in both countries there is currently no separate agency responsible for implementing alternatives and therefore PRI cannot involve other civil society organisations in capacity and institutional building activities. However looking ahead, in both countries, PRI will have an opportunity to involve civil society organisations in the promotion of alternatives.
5. Conclusion

This was an ambitious project with a broad intervention and geographical scope. The broad project design enabled PRI to use the grant to match fund most of the MENA office activities. This enabled PRI to take advantage of unique windows of opportunity, to establish pilots and to secure additional funding from other donors. For example, to establish the Juvenile Police Department in Jordan, PRI used SIDA funds and funds from the Dutch Ministry of Affairs. PRI has therefore strategically used the SIDA grant to leverage additional funding and to expand its interventions in a number of different countries.

A broad and flexible project scope is appropriate because many of the MENA countries are fragile post-conflict states that are in political flux. For example, during the inception phase, Egypt appeared to be a country open to change, whereas Tunisia and Yemen appeared to be difficult places to work. However in 2012 the political situation in Egypt deteriorated and the situation in Tunisia and Yemen improved. The flexible project design enabled PRI to strategically match the scope of its interventions in each country to the political situation. PRI effectively pulled out of Egypt and strategically deployed the resources to Yemen and Tunisia where the prospects for change were greater.

A broad and flexible design does have its drawbacks when it comes to monitoring, evaluating and reporting the project achievements. Evaluating such a broad project design is extremely challenging. For example, outcome 1 was a very broad outcome focused on using international standards to promote a human rights approach to prison management in six countries with a particular focus on vulnerable groups. This outcome also included the introduction of a rehabilitation pilot in Jordan and Tunisia. This is a very broad outcome and it is difficult to determine the extent to which this outcome materialised in the project countries.

The project theory of change therefore seemed to be more focused on breadth of change rather than depth. However it is clear that PRI did achieve some impressive results through this project. PRI used its experience with the Jordanian prison training department to establish a specialised prisons training department in Yemen. PRI helped to establish a Juvenile Police Department in Jordan and is currently working to transfer the model to Yemen. PRI has established an independent monitoring team in Jordan and is working to transfer the model to other MENA contexts. PRI has worked with other agencies to change the penal codes to enable alternatives in Jordan and made a vital contribution to the creation of the new juvenile law in Jordan. These are clear and tangible changes where PRI played an important role. For this project, PRI has been particularly good at developing models of good practice and transferring them to other MENA countries. If PRI could strengthen its monitoring and evaluating systems, it would be in a better position to evidence that these models work and use that evidence to convince political decision makers and international partners to scale them up.

Reading the project narrative reports it is clear that PRI carried out more activities and achieved greater change in Jordan compared to the other project countries. This may be due to the fact that the political situation is stable and PRI’s MENA office is based in Jordan. PRI’s experience in other regions demonstrates that it is easier to achieve change in the home country where PRI has a presence compared to achieving change through partners in neighbouring countries. However it should be noted that this evaluation was focused only on Jordan and Tunisia. PRI’s achievements in the other project countries are not included in this report. For example, one of the key achievements of this project was the establishment of the specialised training department in Yemen.

On the surface it would appear that PRI achieved little in terms of tangible results in Tunisia. However, Tunisia is currently undergoing a process of transition to democracy and the criminal
justice and prison system is in a state of flux and change reflecting the enormous ongoing social and political changes. Criminal justice stakeholders in Tunisia are optimistic about the future prospect of reforming their criminal justice system. International organisations clearly believe that now is the time to invest in Tunisia. For example, the European Union has recently launched multi-million euros programmes to support Tunisian civil society and the Tunisian Ministry of Justice. The SIDA programme has enabled PRI to build trusting relationships with civil society organisations, the Prison Department and the Ministry of Justice. This programme has put PRI in a good position to take advantage of the future funding and reform opportunities in Tunisia. The upcoming elections and the prospect of a new Government with a mandate for change will provide an opportunity for PRI to build on this programme and to bring about real change in Tunisia.
### 6. Lessons learnt and recommendations

#### 6.1 Project design and monitoring

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Identifying a clear theory of change with robust indicators</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recommendation</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Systematic data collection to evidence change</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recommendation</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 6.2 Alternatives to imprisonment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Create a new project to support the independent monitoring team</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lesson</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recommendation</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3 Rehabilitation after-care model

**Develop a rehabilitation after-care model that can be transferred to other contexts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson</th>
<th>The rehabilitation after care pilot was a success in Jordan. PRI’s partners identified a number of key lessons that enabled them to develop the model and transfer it to Tunisia.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td>PRI should fully document the Jordan and Tunisian rehabilitation pilot programmes and create a model of good practice that can be transferred to other PRI regions. PRI should document the results, evidence and learning that was generated through the rehabilitation pilots. PRI should seek to secure additional funding to scale up the pilot projects in Tunisia and Jordan. The PRI MENA region should build on its experience and look for opportunities to transfer the model to other MENA contexts (e.g. Yemen). The model should be packaged in a user-friendly format so that it can be used to support future PRI funding applications. PRI’s Programme Development Team should look for opportunities to transfer and replicate the model in other PRI regions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4 Independent monitoring

**Create a project to support the establishment of community service pilots for juveniles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson</th>
<th>The creation of an independent national monitoring team (INMT) in Jordan was one of the key successes of the project. The team has developed a strong relationship with the Ministry of Social Development and is currently applying to become a registered NGO to sustain its future. The scope of the team is limited to Jordan’s social institutions and does not cover Jordan’s prisons (Correctional and Rehabilitation Centre), which have their own monitoring process. Several key informants noted that Jordan’s system for monitoring the Correction and Rehabilitation Centres was not as strong as the INMT process.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td>PRI MENA can use the success of the independent monitoring team to create a dialogue with the Government about the relative strengths and weaknesses of Jordan’s systems for monitoring the Correction and Rehabilitation Centres. PRI can use this as an opportunity to lobby for a National Preventative monitoring mechanism in Jordan. PRI MENA should also seek to transfer the independent monitoring model to other MENA countries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. References


