



## Humanistic Approach to Reform the Juvenile Criminal Justice System in Jordan

### Impact Evaluation



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## Contents

<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>2</b>
1.1 Project background	2
1.2 Country background and context	3
<b>2. Evaluation Purpose and Methodology</b>	<b>4</b>
2.1 Purpose of the evaluation	4
2.1 Research methodology	4
2.2 Data collection	5
<b>3. Theory of Change</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>4. Results of the Impact Evaluation</b>	<b>9</b>
4.1 Target Outcome 1 – Juvenile Police Department	9
4.2 Target Outcome 2 – Alternatives to deprivation of liberty for juveniles	15
4.3 Target Outcome 3 – Independent nation monitoring mechanism	19
<b>5. Conclusion</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>6. Lessons Learnt and Recommendations</b>	<b>26</b>
6.1 Project design, monitoring and evaluation	26
6.2 Juvenile Police Department	26
6.3 Juvenile alternatives	27
6.4 Independent monitoring	27
<b>7. References</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>Annex 1 – Timeline matrix</b>	<b>29</b>

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Project background

In 2011, Penal Reform International's (PRI) Middle East and North Africa (MENA) OFFICE submitted a juvenile justice application to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The project, entitled: 'Humanistic Approach to Reform the Juvenile Criminal System' was approved and commenced in September 2011. For a summary overview of the project, see table 1 below. The two year project (September 2011 – August 2013) was implemented in three countries: Jordan, Egypt and Yemen. Due to limitations of time and resources, this evaluation will focus on Jordan only.

<b>Project Title:</b>	Humanistic Approach to Reform the Juvenile Criminal System
<b>Timeframe:</b>	September 2011 – August 2013
<b>Funding partner:</b>	Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>Geographical scope:</b>	Jordan, Egypt and Yemen
<b>Overall objective:</b>	Strengthening juvenile justice mechanisms in Jordan, Egypt and Yemen based on international standards and guidelines relating to the administration of juvenile justice to ensure that institutions dealing with children in conflict with the law are in line with the restorative justice approach
<b>Specific objectives:</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Support the creation of specialised police centres for juveniles</li> <li>2) Promoting and supporting the increased use of alternatives to imprisonment (community sanctions); also alternative measures in Juvenile Justice (diversion, mediation, educational measures of coercion)</li> <li>3) Fostering the creation of independent inspection mechanisms to monitor juvenile facilities, using success experiences on the international level and engage civil society to do so</li> </ol>
<b>Activities:</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Training workshops</li> <li>- Roundtable meetings, events and workshops</li> <li>- Promotional work through media (radio interviews and newspaper articles)</li> <li>- Lobbying and support through bilateral meetings</li> <li>- Research and publications</li> <li>- Promotion of good practice model examples</li> <li>- Study tour</li> <li>- Provision of expertise and technical support</li> </ul>
<b>Budget:</b>	238,035 Euros
<b>Project stakeholders</b>	<p><i>Beneficiaries</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Children in conflict with the law (ultimate beneficiary)</li> <li>- Juvenile Police Department and partner agencies (objective 1)</li> <li>- Juvenile judges, judiciary and policy makers (objective 2)</li> <li>- National Independent Monitoring Team, juvenile facilities (objective 3)</li> </ul> <p><i>Government</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ministry of Social Development</li> <li>- Directorate of Social Defence</li> </ul> <p><i>Implementing partners</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Change Academy</li> <li>- Mizan (law group)</li> <li>- Adaleh Centre for Human Rights</li> <li>- National Centre for Human Rights</li> </ul> <p><i>International organisations</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Dutch Ministry of Foreign affairs</li> <li>- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)</li> <li>- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)</li> </ul>

Table 1: Summary information of the project

## 1.2 Country background and context

In 1991 Jordan ratified both the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention against Torture (CAT), both of which contain specific Articles that prescribe state obligations with regards to children in conflict with the law. For example, Article 37 of the CRC protects children from unlawful or arbitrary arrest, detention, or imprisonment and requires that such measures be used only as a last resort and for the shortest possible time. Article 40 of the CRC addresses the administration of juvenile justice and stresses the positive rehabilitation of the child, thereby encouraging their successful re-entry into the community. A recent study by Jordan's National Centre for Human Rights (Al-Tarawneh et al, 2013), used such international standards to analyse Jordan's legislation and criminal justice system in relation to children in conflict with the law. The study concluded that Jordan still lacks an independent juvenile criminal justice system that is in line with international standards. More specifically, it noted that Jordan lacks:

- a special juvenile police department;
- special juvenile courts with trained staff and specialised juvenile judges;
- independent public prosecution that takes care of juvenile issues;
- programs to ensure juveniles' correction at the detention, education and correction centres (Al-Tarawneh et al, 2013: 7).

Jordan's current national law that covers juveniles (Jordanian Juvenile Law Number 24) was adopted in 1968 and amended in 1983 and 2002. This law states that juveniles will be protected before and during court proceedings, sentencing and imprisonment. The minimal age of criminal responsibility is 7 years old. There are several gaps in the current law and it does not adhere to international standards. For example, there is no provision or legal basis for (a) specialised juvenile police units; (b) alternatives to the deprivation of liberty; (c) an independent monitoring mechanism to monitor Jordan's six juvenile detention facilities. A new juvenile law has recently been drafted that addresses all these issues. For example, it seeks to raise the minimum age of criminal responsibility to 12 and contains dedicated articles for a special juvenile police unit, specialised juvenile judiciary, alternatives to detention and independent monitoring. The new juvenile law is currently with the Jordanian Legislative Bureau awaiting approval.

There are a total of six juvenile detention facilities in Jordan. The Directorate of Social Defence (under the Ministry of Social Development) is responsible for overseeing the juvenile facilities. The post-trial detention centres are called Juvenile Rehabilitation Centres, which are often referred to as Juvenile Care Centres. For children in conflict with the law, the term 'Care Centre' can be misleading term and suggests a voluntary attendance. The Juvenile Care Centres in Jordan are mandatory detention centres. Table 2 shows that the number of children held in pre-trial detention has steadily decreased since 2010 and that the number of children held post-trial has sharply decreased between 2010 and 2013

Year	No of juveniles - pre-trial detention	No of juveniles - post-trial detention
2010	4,371	2,614
2011	2,174	206
2012	2,346	149
2013 until September	1,771	87

Table 2: Juvenile detention figures (source: Advisor for the Directorate of Social Defence)

## 2. Evaluation Purpose and Methodology

### 2.1 Evaluation purpose

This evaluation forms part of a series of evaluations being undertaken by PRI in an effort to test and develop methods to rigorously assess and effectively communicate the medium-to-long-term impact of PRI's projects and programmes. See Box 1 for a definition of impact evaluation.

#### **Box 1: Defining Impact Evaluation**

Stern et al (2012) define impact evaluation as:

- Evaluating the positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects on final beneficiaries that result from an intervention;
- Assessing the direct and indirect causal contribution claims of these interventions to such effects especially for the poor whether intended or unintended;
- Explaining how policy interventions contribute to an effect so that lessons can be learnt

Much of PRI's work is essentially advocacy and policy-based which produce intangible outcomes (eg. raised awareness) that are difficult to measure. Moreover, complex advocacy-based interventions do not lend themselves to traditional quasi-experimental impact evaluation designs.

PRI works primarily at enabling change at an institutional level (eg. Government) and rarely works directly with its final beneficiaries (eg. children in conflict with the law). Moreover, most of PRI's work is project-based with defined timeframes of typically 2-3 years. Trickle-down changes which improve the situation of children in conflict with the law do not fit neatly within these 2-3 year timeframes. Results take time to mature and evaluations are typically done at the end of a project. For example, the new Juvenile Law could be approved in 2014 but it could take a further 3-5 years to fully establish an effective system of alternative measures that will directly benefit children in conflict with the law. To assess change at the final beneficiary level, this evaluation would therefore need to be carried out 3-5 years after the project has ended to allow for the trickle-down effects to occur. However, in 3-5 years' time it would be extremely difficult to assess PRI's contribution to such changes because of the number of external factors involved (eg. other interventions and changes in the political and legal context) and PRI would miss the opportunity to draw lessons from the evaluation that can be incorporated into future project design.

As part of PRI's broader Evaluation and Learning Plan, PRI's Evaluation and Organisational Learning Adviser (Adviser) is undertaking a series of evaluations to identify, develop and test some impact evaluation models that could help to overcome some of the challenges described above. This evaluation represents the second in the evaluation series and the Adviser has adapted a rigorous quantitative research methodology known as Process Tracing. The impact evaluation will focus on assessing the short to medium-term outcomes that occur at the institutional level (eg. legislative and policy changes).

### 2.2 Research methodology

Process tracing is consistent with a theory-based evaluation design (see Box 2 over page). Impact evaluation is an opportunity to test a programme's theory through the links in the causal chain. In terms of method, this tendency is close to 'process tracing' (George and McKeown, 1985; Collier,

2011), which is defined by Aminzade (1993) as ‘theoretically explicit narratives that carefully trace and compare the sequence of events constituting the process’. These casual chains are typically represented graphically as a causal map.

### **Box 2: Theory-Based Evaluation**

In order to explain we need theory to bridge the gap between data and interpretation of that data; and in the case of impact evaluation to bridge the gap between ‘causes’ and ‘effect’.

Theory-based evaluation is process orientated. It regards the programme as a conjunction of causes that follow a sequence. It follows a change pathway of a programme from its initiation through various causal links in a chain of implementation, until intended outcomes are reached. The process is built upon a ‘theory of change’ - a set of assumptions about how an intervention achieves its goals and under what conditions (Stern et al, 2012).

Process Tracing is a complex methodology in which a series of preparatory steps culminate in the identification, by key project stakeholders, of a set of targeted outcomes. These represent the most recent and important desired achievements of the project. Once these targeted outcomes are identified and clearly stated, data collection and analysis focus on determining the extent to which these targeted outcomes were realised and the importance of the project’s contribution to those outcomes. Oxfam have developed a Process Tracing Protocol that outlines the key steps involved in the process. Drawing on the guidance provided by Oxfam’s protocol, the Adviser facilitated a Process Tracing evaluation exercise that included the following steps.

1. Analysis of project documentation generated by PRI.
2. Work with the PRI Middle East and North Africa (MENA) team to reconstruct a theory of change for the project.
3. Analysis of project activities (eg. monitoring reports) to develop a detailed timeframe matrix for the project (timeframe matrix was organised by the targeted outcomes).
4. Interviews with a range of external stakeholders to identify and evidence (a) what targeted outcomes actually materialised; (b) the plausible causal explanations that underpinned the targeted outcomes; (c) PRI’s contribution to the change.
5. Analysis of additional documentation (eg. relevant reports produced by other agencies) and secondary data (eg. Government statistics) to verify the qualitative data collected in step 4.
6. Drafting a final report documenting the research process and key findings.

### **2.3 Data collection**

Data collection is a key element of the Process Tracing method. To gather the information necessary to carry out this evaluation, the Adviser used the following data collection methods.

1. Analysis of project information generated by PRI, which included:
  - project planning documents;
  - annual monitoring report sent to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of Year 1;
  - project activity reports (eg. training workshops and roundtables) completed by the Project Coordinator.

2. Review of a sample of the large number of reports, publications, and other grey material generated by external project stakeholders. This documentation included:
  - Juvenile Criminal Justice in Jordan (2013), The National Centre for Human Rights;
  - Terminal Evaluation Report (2012) of the 'Strengthening the legislative and institutional capacity of the juvenile justice system in Jordan', UNODC;
  - Safeguarding children in detention: Independent monitoring mechanisms for children in detention in MENA (2011), PRI publication from a previous juvenile justice project funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).
3. Semi-structured interviews and email correspondence with key PRI MENA staff (PRI MENA Regional Director and the Project Coordinator).
4. Semi-structured interviews with key informants from external project stakeholders who were in a position to offer specific validation of evidence regarding the targeted outcomes. Key informants included representatives from the following stakeholders:
  - UNICEF – Child Protection Specialist (international partner)
  - Juvenile Police Department – Staff Colonel (beneficiary)
  - Social Defence Directorate – Head of Department (government)
  - Reform and Rehabilitation Unit Manager / former juvenile judge (judiciary)
  - Member of the national independent inspection team (beneficiary)
  - Academy of Change for Democracy and Development Studies – President (partner)
5. A focus group discussion (10 October 2013) with the Reform and Rehabilitation Unit Manager, the member of the national independent inspection team, and the President of Change Academy.
6. A field visit (9 October 2013) to the Amman Centre for Juveniles – a pre-trial detention centre for male offenders, 12-16 years of age. The field visit provided an opportunity to view the facilities and to talk informally to the Director of the Centre.



### 3. Theory of change

Figure 1 (see next page) outlines the theory of change for the project. In consultation with PRI MENA staff, three target outcomes were identified to focus the evaluation:

- Target Outcome 1 – Increased capacity and improved performance of the Juvenile Police Department.
- Target Outcome 2 – Increased public and institutional awareness of alternatives to the deprivation of liberty for juveniles.
- Target Outcome 3 – Increased capacity and improved performance of the independent monitoring team, including the adoption and implementation of standards for monitoring and inspection.

These three outcomes were chosen because they correspond to the main three strands of the project. The first strand focused on the Juvenile Police Department; the second on juvenile alternatives to the deprivation of liberty; and the third on independent monitoring of juvenile detention facilities.

The theory of change shows that for each of these strands, Jordan is at a different stage of development in terms of realising the longer-term impact of safeguarding the rights of children in conflict with the law. The first outcome covers the pre-trial stage of the criminal justice system and focuses on diverting juvenile offenders from the court system. The focus here is very much on prevention of and mediation for minor offences. In January 2012, a Juvenile Police Department was set up as a pilot project in the North Amman District. Building on a previous project that focused on the creation of the Department, in this project PRI focused on developing its capacity and improving its performance.

The second outcome is focused on alternatives to the deprivation of liberty for the more serious juvenile cases that do go to trial. This outcome area is very much at the early stages of the development life cycle. There is a limited basis for alternatives in the Jordanian legal system and judges are reluctant to use alternative sanctions during sentencing. With the exception of some pilot projects, alternatives such as community service programmes have not been setup in Jordan. For this project, PRI therefore focused on increased public and institutional awareness of alternatives to imprisonment for juveniles in Jordan with the medium-term objective of the creation and adoption of a law on alternatives for juveniles. The longer-term outcomes and impact associated with this outcome area may well take 10-15 years to materialise. The longer-term nature of this result was taken into consideration when judging the projects achievements under Outcome 2.

The third outcome is focused on post-trial detention and the establishment of a national independent monitoring mechanism. At the beginning of the project, there was no independent monitoring mechanism in Jordan. With PRI's help, an independent monitoring mechanism was established in 2013. The project activities have very much focused on establishing monitoring standards and developing the monitoring team's capacity. The longer-term outcomes associated with institutionalisation of the independent monitoring mechanism and the implementation of the team's recommendations will be a focus of future PRI projects.

A detailed theory of change for each targeted outcome is presented in the next section.






Figure 1: Theory of Change for the Reform of the Criminal Justice System Project

## 4. Results of the Impact Evaluation

### 4.1 Target Outcome 1: Increased capacity and improved performance of the Juvenile Police Department

In March 2011, the Department of Public Security in Jordan created a new administrative body – the Juvenile Police Department (JPD) - specialised in dealing with children in conflict with the law. The JPD was officially created on 1 January 2012 as a pilot to cover the North Amman District. The objectives of the JPD are to:

- improve police procedures dealing with juvenile offenders;
- ensure respect for human dignity and juveniles' rights
- encourage alternatives to incarceration, in accordance with domestic legislation, when dealing with minor offences committed by juveniles;
- partner with governmental and non-governmental institutions working with juveniles;
- consolidate partnership and collaboration with the local community;
- increase public awareness of juvenile delinquency and gain local community support for the mission of the department (<http://www.juvenilepolice.psd.gov>, accessed 25/11/13).

#### Extent to which the outcome materialised

The outcome indicators associated with improved performance of the JPD are: (a) number of juveniles who are diverted from the criminal justice system; and (b) percentage of cases that are diverted. In PRI's first year annual monitoring report to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs the following statistics are quoted:

Between 1 January 2012 and September 2012, the JPD dealt with 229 cases and 179 of those cases were solved at the police level and diverted from the criminal justice system – 78% of the total number of cases. (PRI MENA Annual Report to Dutch Ministry of Affairs, September 2011 – August 2012)

However the author of the report does not provide a source for these figures, which raises questions over the reliability of the statistics. The evaluator asked each of the interviewees about the Department's diversion rates:

The department has a 70% success rate of resolving cases through mediation. (Interview with UNICEF, 8 October 2013)

600 children have been diverted from detention since the creation of the JPD. Approximately 90% of cases are diverted. Only two in every twenty cases go through the court system. (Interview with Juvenile Police Department, 9 October 2013)

Since the creation of the JPD, 70% of cases have been diverted in the North Amman region; 30% of cases have gone to court. This is a good achievement because there is no legal basis for diversion. (Interview with Rehabilitation Unit Manager, 10 October 2013)

Qualitative evidence gained through interviews with project stakeholders therefore suggests that between January 2012 and October 2013 70-90% of juvenile cases that are dealt with the JPD have been diverted from the courts. Statistics to back-up this evidence were requested by the evaluator. However, despite promises from the JPD to supply this information, it was not forthcoming. To make a judgement on the significance of these figures, the evaluator attempted to find out: (a) baseline information – diversion figures in the North Amman District before the creation of the department in 2012; and (b) counterfactual information – comparison diversion figures for other Jordanian

Districts. Baseline and counterfactual information were unknown. However, the UNICEF interviewee said that approximately 30% of cases are diverted from the courts in other Districts of Jordan. If this estimate is accurate, by comparison, a 70-90% diversion rate is a major achievement for the JPD and is a strong indicator of the realisation of this outcome.

In terms of increased capacity of the JPD, outcome indicators include: (a) extent to which new procedures are created and implemented; (b) percentage of staff that follow the procedures on a day-to-day basis; and (c) increased levels of knowledge and skills reported by JPD staff and partners trained by PRI on restorative approaches and conflict resolution/mediation.

The JPD has 170 staff members (Interview with JPD, 9 October 2013) and since its creation several procedures have been put in place, including:

- a three-year human resource strategy (Interview with JPD, 9 October 2013);
- comprehensive training for new staff (Interview with JPD, 9 October 2013);
- An operations manual for staff that outlines a step-by-step approach (Interview with JPD, 9 October 2013);
- a Procedural Guide for Police working with Juveniles (Project annual monitoring report);
- a Code of Ethics for the JPD (Project annual monitoring report).

The operations manual and procedural guide feature a restorative justice cycle that shows each stage of the juvenile system from the child's perspective. PRI helped the JPD to create the cycle and also produced and distributed posters of the cycle. The evaluator visited a juvenile pre-trial facility in Amman on 9 October 2013 and noticed that two posters of the cycle were on public display in the reception area. This demonstrates that the cycle has been widely promoted beyond the Department and is accessible to children who are in contact with the law. Taken together, these new standards and policies demonstrate that the sub-outcome – improved structures, procedures and policies of the JPD – was realised during the project timeframe. However, it is difficult to assess the extent to which these procedures and policies have been followed by JPD staff and partners on a day-to-day basis. The JPD Chief Colonel noted:

The operations manual is a step-by-step guide for staff members. New staff members use it for their first two cases to guide them through the system – it tells them what they should do at each stage. The knowledge then becomes tacit and they do not need to rely on the manual. (Interview with JPD, 9 October 2013)

This suggests that at least to some extent the policies are being followed by staff. However in future, PRI and the JPD should monitor compliance with policies and procedures in a more systematic way. PRI held several training workshops for JPD staff and partners during the project period (see PRI contribution section below). PRI's annual monitoring report noted:

As a result of the training, participants became more aware of mediation and conflict management skills. The JPD is developing its internal procedures and guidelines based on the training discussions and outcomes. Additionally, participants became more aware of the concept of diversion, and how this can be achieved by using practical tools and skills.

This statement is consistent with qualitative information gained through the evaluation interviews. Several interviewees noted that PRI held training workshops on restorative justice and mediation, which helped to develop the participants' knowledge and skills in these areas. However, PRI did not produce quantitative information or qualitative feedback from the participants to evidence increased levels of knowledge and skills. For example, results from an end-of-training questionnaire and 6-month follow-up questionnaire were not made available to the evaluator.

Overall, the qualitative information gained from the evaluation interviews seems to suggest that during the project period the performance and the capacity of the JPD did improve and increase. However, reliable quantitative information is not available to evidence the extent to which the outcome actually materialised.

### Causal explanation

The theory of change below (Figure 2) illustrates a detailed theory of change for outcome 1: increased capacity and improved performance of the Juvenile Police Department.




Figure 2: Juvenile Police Department in Jordan: Theory of Change

The Juvenile Police Department was established as a pilot in January 2012 to cover the North Amman District. International organisations such as Penal Reform International and local quasi-governmental organisations such as the Jordanian National Centre for Human Rights, have been advocating for the establishment of a specialised juvenile police unit. Such organisations draw upon justice for children international good practice and standards that recognise the importance of creating specialised juvenile police. For example, Rule 12 of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules) notes:

In order to best fulfil their functions, police officers who frequently or exclusively deal with juveniles or who are primarily engaged in the prevention of juvenile crime shall be specially instructed and trained. In large cities, special police units should be established for that purpose. (Beijing Rules, 1989)

PRI's 'Ten-point plan for a fair and effective criminal justice for children' highlights how a specialised juvenile police department is an important ingredient of a separate juvenile criminal justice system:

A separate system for all those over the age of criminal responsibility and under the age of 18 should be set up and this should be engaged from the moment of first contact until all involvement with the system is concluded. It should apply regardless of the nature of the offence and, taking resources into account, should consist of separate and specialist authorities and institutions, including separate units within police stations and separate courts, which are furnished and arranged in a child-friendly manner and staffed by specialised judges. (PRI, 2013)

The Jordanian National Centre for Human Rights recently published a report on juvenile criminal justice in Jordan (2013), which stated that Jordan lacked an independent criminal justice system that adhered to international standards. Despite the establishment of the pilot Juvenile Police Department in North Amman, the report specifically noted that Jordan lacks a specialised juvenile police.

The Staff Colonel of the JPD noted that the original idea for a specialised juvenile police department in Jordan came from the Family Protection Centre. The centre reached the conclusion that there was a need for a specialised department for juveniles that used a child-friendly restorative justice approach to focus on prevention and diversion of juveniles from the criminal justice system.

Since the establishment of the Department in January 2012, there have been concerted efforts to create a child-friendly culture that is based on restorative justice principles. This has been achieved through a parallel strategy of (a) creating procedures, policies and guidelines based on restorative justice principles; and (b) training the JPD staff and supporting agencies on restorative justice, mediation and preventative strategies. As highlighted in the previous section, several policies and procedures have been created and implemented by the Department. Such policies and procedures are extremely important for a new Department that is growing rapidly with plans to expand its scope to cover other Districts of Jordan. Indeed, the Staff Colonel of the JPD noted that he plans to open new offices for the Department in January 2014 and hopes to expand the scope of the Department to open six additional offices covering six additional regions with the long-term goal of covering the entire Kingdom of Jordan. However in order to expand there are a number of constraints and obstacles that need to be overcome:

- Financial constraints – the Department currently does not have a budget allocation to open new offices. The Department has submitted several applications to international organisations requesting financial support to pay office rent for 12 months.

- Legal constraints – there is no legal basis for a specialised juvenile police department in the current legislation. The new juvenile justice law that is currently with Parliament will address this. The Staff Colonel noted: ‘the current legislation is a major challenge for us; when the new law is approved we can expand’ (Interview, 9 October 2013). Article 10 of the draft juvenile justice law establishes a legal basis for the creation of a juvenile police department and Article 14 outlines its responsibilities.
- Turnover of staff – the Department has a highly qualified staff and has invested heavily to develop their skills and capacity. The Department therefore needs to ensure that it retains its staff and maintains a low staff turnover rate.

As the Theory of Change (Figure 2) shows, policy makers, budget holders and decision makers in the relevant Government Ministries will use evidence of the Department’s performance (eg. diversion rates) to decide whether the Department is a successful pilot and should receive budgetary support to expand. It is therefore important that the Department establishes a systematic monitoring system that tracks key performance indicators such as diversion rates and number of cases completed. As part of this evidence portfolio, the Department should also capture and document its success stories. For example, the Staff Colonel recalled a recent incident that highlighted the importance of their preventative work:

One of the real benefits of the JPD is that parents can come to us and ask for our help with prevention. For example, a few days ago, a parent came to us and told us how their son had started to experiment with drugs and they were concerned for him. We sent a social worker to go and talk to the child - the social worker raised his awareness about the dangers of drugs and how his actions could destroy his future. We have received some very positive feedback from parents about this kind of preventative work. We always ensure that the social worker follows up with the family. (Interview, 9 October 2013)

The evaluator passed on this story to a later interviewee and she noted that it was a great indicator of success: ‘This type of preventative work is a huge development; it shows that parents trust the Police Department, it is somewhere they can go to for help. It also shows that news of the Department is spreading through the community.’ (Interview with Rehabilitation Unit Manager, 10 October 2013).

The JPD has also been widely acclaimed for its mediation work. Within the JPD headquarters, there are several meeting rooms that are dedicated to mediation. When an incident occurs, JPD officers will attempt to call a mediation meeting that involves: the victim and his/her family; the offender and his/her family; a Social Worker; and a Probation Officer. Several interviewees noted that mediation is embedded in the Jordanian tribal culture: ‘it is our culture to look for resolutions’ (Interview with JPD, 9 October 2013). For minor offences, mediation is seen as a preference for Jordanian people. Moreover, the JPD has invested in developing its staff’s conflict resolution and negotiation skills. As a result, the Department has been able to implement a restorative justice approach that has successfully diverted children from the criminal justice system, which accounts for its impressive 70-90% diversion rate.

### PRI’s contribution

In previous projects PRI advocated for the establishment of the Juvenile Police Department. Indeed, several interviewees noted that PRI played an important role in establishing the Department:

PRI had a huge role in creating this Department. Taghreed (PRI MENA Regional Director) pushed a lot with Government to create the Department and she is very good at raising the profile and awareness of the Department with a variety of different stakeholders. (Interview with JPD, 9 October 2013)

Building on its earlier work to help establish the Department, for this project PRI focused on increasing the capacity and improving the performance of the department. To do this, PRI carried out a number of activities during the first year of the project (see Table 3).

Activity	Outputs	Outcome
Training workshop on restorative justice (20-24 November 2011)	32 participants from the JPD and partner agencies attended the workshop.	Pre- and post- training evaluations showed that the training increased participants' knowledge of restorative justice by 45% (evidence: project annual report)
Two training workshop on interviewing skills, conflict management and mediation (4-8 Dec 2011; 20-24 November 2012 )	25 participants from the JPD who actively participated in the November training attended the first workshop. 26 participants (7 judges, 2 prosecutors; 11 JPD officers; 5 social workers; 1 lawyer) attended the second workshop.	The training increased participants' skills on mediation and conflict management (evidence: project annual report and interview with former judge who attended both workshops)
Study tour visit to the police management and juvenile departments in the Netherlands (25-29 June 2012)	11 participants attended the tour, including 3 from Jordan representing the JPD, Department of Public Security and Ministry of Social Development.	Based on the lessons learnt from the visit, the participants created an action plan to implement in their home country (evidence: annual report). It is unclear whether the plans were implemented.
Team of 8 experts developed procedures and guidelines for the Department (Sep 11-Aug 12)	The team produced a guide, entitled 'Procedural Guide for Police Working with Juveniles'. 500 copies of the guide were printed for the JPD. The team also created a child-friendly cycle poster, Staff Handbook and Code of Ethics for the Department.	Child-friendly restorative justice work procedures were adopted and implemented by the Department, which were later fed into a staff handbook (evidence: annual report and interview with PRI Project Manager).
Communications and media support to the JPD (Sep 11-Aug 12)	Key communications documents were drafted, including: vision statement, mission statement and mandate. Translation and printing of promotional documents. 1,000 event packages were produced (folders, pens and brochures with JPD logo).	Clarification of JPD's key messages helps to ensure the Department outwardly projects a child-friendly restorative justice image, which increases public awareness of the Department (evidence: interview with JPD Staff Colonel)

*Table 3: PRI's Juvenile Police Department Activities*

The theory of change (Figure 2) shows that each of these activities complemented each other to successfully achieve several outcomes related to capacity development and performance improvement. Table 3 demonstrates that PRI made a significant direct contribution to three outcomes: (a) increased public support for the JPD; (b) improved structures, procedures and policies of the JPD; (c) JPD staff and supporting agencies adopt and use a restorative justice approach. PRI therefore achieved its objective of increasing the Department's capacity, which in turn led to improved performance of the Department and an increase in the number of children diverted from the formal criminal justice system.

It should also be noted that other NGOs and international organisations, for example UNICEF and UNODC, also made a significant contribution to developing the capacity of the Department. Such organisations provided study tours, developed publications and helped to furnish the Department's Headquarters (Interview with the JPD, 9 October 2013). Such contributions should be seen as complementary to PRI's activities.



## 4.2 Target Outcome 2: Increased public and institutional awareness of alternatives to the deprivation of liberty for juveniles

There is a limited basis for alternatives in the Jordanian legal system for both juveniles and adults. Alternative sanctions are therefore a new concept and judges are reluctant to use them because there is no legal basis and no established schemes to oversee their implementation.

### Extent to which the outcome materialised

As the Theory of Change highlights (Figure 3), Jordan is very much in the early stages of developing alternatives to detention for juveniles. The project therefore focused on relatively short-medium term outcomes associated with raising public awareness and building the political will to establish a legal basis for alternatives. These outcomes need to be achieved first before organisations like PRI can focus on increasing the use of alternatives during sentencing and building the capacity of the implementing agency to ensure they are effectively enforced.

Despite the long-term nature of this work, in the past few years there have been some significant positive developments towards the establishment of a system of alternative non-custodial measures for juveniles in Jordan. UNICEF is currently implementing a pilot juvenile diversion project in Irbid, which has resulted in the establishment of a community service programme. In 2013, 24 children were diverted from detention into this 16-week programme which focuses on rehabilitation, socialisation and correction (Interview with UNICEF, 8 October 2013). Despite the low numbers, the establishment of such pilot programmes is a step in the right direction.

A new juvenile law has been drafted that contains provisions for alternatives to the deprivation of liberty. Article 33 of the draft law states that during sentencing an execution judge has the power to replace an imprisonment sentence (if does not exceed one year) with a community service sanction. The new juvenile law stipulates that this should be mandatory for first-time offenders. The law has been drafted and is currently with the Jordanian Legislative Bureau awaiting approval. The fact that this law has been drafted with a provision for alternatives and is broadly accepted by juvenile justice stakeholders is an indicator that there is increased political will to establish and use alternatives to custody for juveniles. However, there is little evidence that there is public support for alternatives to imprisonment, which is a vital ingredient for success. PRI is therefore right to take a long-term perspective and to focus on increasing public support. Overall during the project period, there is strong evidence that there has been increased political will for alternatives but little evidence that there has been an increase in public support.

### Causal explanation

In the previous section it was noted that non-custodial alternatives are a relatively new concept in Jordan. The Theory of Change below (Figure 3) is therefore a hypothetical analysis of how change could happen. A theory of change for alternatives should contain three main strands:

- 1) A change in approach towards sentencing, which includes the increased use of alternatives. This strand focuses on legislative and policy changes to enable the use of alternative sentences and the establishment of alternative programmes.
- 2) The effective implementation of alternative sanctions. Once an alternative sentence is passed, the sanction needs to be implemented. For example, a community service order requires the establishment of a community service programme; matching offenders to the right placements; monitoring and supervision of the cases. This often involves capacity development of the implementing agency (eg. Probation Agency or specialised department).

3) Public support for alternatives is required for both changes in approach and the effective implementation of alternative sanctions. For example, a community service order is based on restorative justice principles where an offender offers something back to the community usually through voluntary work. To be effective this involves the support of the local community.




Figure 3: Non-custodial alternatives in Jordan: Theory of Change

The focus in Jordan is very much on the first strand: changing the legislation and policy so that judges can use alternative sanctions during sentencing. PRI and other actors such as UNICEF and UNODC have very much focused on increasing political will and drafting new legislation. However, PRI has taken a long-term perspective and has also focused on creating public support for alternatives. PRI's MENA Regional Director noted:

Public support for alternatives in Jordan is low. The Jordanian tribal culture lends itself towards revenge and imprisonment rather than humanistic alternatives. Institutionalising alternatives to imprisonment in Jordan should therefore be seen a long-term initiative. It could take 10 years to make real progress in this area. (Interview with PRI MENA Regional Director, 7 October 2013)

Drafting a new law that contains provisions for alternatives is an important achievement in its own right. However, there is an important difference between submitting a new law, the approval of that law, and the implementation of the law:

The new law would change our traditional understanding and approach to sentencing. There will be some resistance from our community and certain stakeholders. However, open-minded people can push the law forward. There is a need for educational activities that raises the public's awareness on alternatives to detention. (Interview with Reform and Rehabilitation Manager / former Juvenile Judge, 10 October 2013)

The above statement suggests that public support is required in the long-term if the legislation and ensuing policy is to be implemented. Moreover, the alternative programmes themselves need to be set up and implemented and an agency needs to be empowered with the responsibility to enforce and implement such sanctions.

To summarise, is the development of non-custodial alternatives is still at an early stage of development in Jordan. However, if the draft juvenile law is approved, there is an opportunity to establish and embed an alternatives system.

### PRI contribution

During an interview with the Project Coordinator and PRI's MENA Regional Directors, the Regional Director said that she felt the alternatives strand of the project was the weakest in terms of what has been achieved in the project timeframe and PRI's contribution to those achievements. Indeed, the impact of the alternatives work that has been done so far should be reviewed in 3-5 years' time to allow time for the results to mature. Table 4 provides a summary of the activities that PRI carried out on alternatives for this project.

Activity	Outputs	Outcome
PRI organised a series of meetings for juvenile justice stakeholders in Jordan (11 October 2011).	Participants drafted a strategic framework, entitled: 'Juvenile justice institutional network', that mandated the network with the following responsibilities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Planning the JJ system</li> <li>- Demonstrating evidence of the JJ system progress</li> <li>- Action planning</li> <li>- Coordination and resource mobilisation of JJ projects</li> <li>- Exchanging lessons learnt</li> </ul>	The framework was approved by all stakeholders which led to the establishment of a JJ network, which is led by the Ministry of Social Development. PRI was given the responsibility of hosting / providing the network secretariat for the first year.  The network has helped to increase the coordination between the different JJ stakeholders in Jordan, helping to create a more strategic approach that avoids resource duplication.
Research and drafting of a publication on Alternatives to Imprisonment in the Arab world (April 2012).	The research highlights a number of best practices from around the world and provides tips on how three targeted countries (Jordan, Yemen, and Egypt) can create their own system of alternatives. 500 copies of the publication were circulated within the MENA region.	It is assumed that the research and publication have led to an increase in awareness on alternatives in the MENA region and a sharing of international good practice, which was fed into the drafting of the alternatives section of the new juvenile law. However, there is no evidence to back up this claim
Training workshop for juvenile judges about alternative sanctions (5-6 June 2013).	19 juvenile judges from the 12 governorates of Jordan attended the training workshop.	It is assumed that the training increased the judges' awareness, knowledge and skills on alternative sanctions, which in the medium-long term (when new law is approved) should lead to an increased number of alternatives sanctions used during juvenile sentencing.

Workshop on alternatives in Jordan: 'Alternative sanctions to detention: prospects for and ways of promoting their application in Jordan' (3-4 Oct 2012).	Participants from the media, rehabilitation centre, Ministry of Social Development and NGOs active in penal reform attended the workshop. A media article was produced and disseminated to media outlets covering a summary of the main topics discussed during the workshop.	The workshop helped to define the role of the media in promoting alternative sanctions and identified specific topics for media coverage, which in turn led to increased media coverage on alternatives. As the Theory of Change shows (Figure 3), increased media coverage is important for achieving public support for alternatives.
PRI organised a review meeting on the new draft of the juvenile law (8 July 2013).	11 national stakeholders attended the meeting.	Contributed to the drafting of the section on non-custodial alternatives in the new juvenile law. Based on discussions at the meeting, recommendations were submitted to the drafting committee. Unclear whether these recommendations were taken up and used to write/amend this the new law.
Justice for Children conference in Jordan (20-21 August 2013).	150 participants from all over the Jordan attended the conference.	During the conference PRI launched a review of the draft of the juvenile law. It is assumed that this review contributed to the drafting process of the law. However, evidence to show the contribution of the conference to the drafting process of the new law is lacking.

*Table 4: PRI's Alternatives Activities*

On alternatives, the main achievement to date has been the drafting of the new juvenile law that contains an article on non-custodial alternatives with a focus on community service. Several international organisations (eg. UNICEF and UNODC) and civil society actors contributed to the drafting of the new law. However, several interviewees noted that PRI played an important role in the drafting of the alternatives section:

If approved, the new juvenile law will contain provisions for alternatives. We hope that the law will be approved at the November 2013 session. PRI have been working on the drafting of this law, particularly the alternatives section (Interview with UNICEF, 8 October 2013)

PRI has supported the development of the new juvenile law. PRI organised workshops and meetings on alternatives to imprisonment. Based on the output of the workshops, PRI submitted recommendations on the alternatives section to the drafting committee (Interview with Reform and Rehabilitation Unit Manager, 10 October 2013)

PRI's activities (Table 4) confirm that PRI did make a significant contribution to the drafting of the alternatives section of the new law. However, the objectives and outcome in the project proposal were centred on increased public support for alternatives. Although PRI did do some work with the media to raise the profile of alternatives in Jordan, most of the activities were concentrated on the drafting and review of the alternatives section of the new law. Therefore the project objectives should have been more focused on legislative amendments. However, PRI should be commended for adapting the project strategy to take advantage of the opportunity to contribute to the drafting process. In the short term, the drafting of the new law was more important than focusing on public support because it was a unique window of opportunity. In future projects PRI will no doubt continue to focus on the long-term process of raising public support for alternatives in Jordan.

PRI's technical expertise on alternatives and its role as an interlocutor between international organisations and national human rights organisations, place PRI in a unique position to contribute the establishment of an alternatives system in Jordan. If the new law is approved, there will be an important role for PRI to help with the implementation and enforcement of the new law:

We touch base with PRI regularly. PRI is an important anchor. Sometimes you need technical people that can give you advice and technical support. (Interview with UNICEF, 8 October 2013)

Overall it can be said that PRI seemed to make a significant contribution to the drafting of the alternatives section of the new juvenile law. However, PRI should collect more evidence to show the link between its activities and the actual writing and review of the law. For example, what recommendations were submitted to the committee and were the recommendations taken up? Were these recommendations reflected in the content of the final draft of the new law? In future, by strengthening its monitoring and evaluation system, the PRI MENA region can systematically collect evidence to show its contribution to legislative and policy changes.

### 4.3 Target Outcome 3: Increased capacity and improved performance of the independent monitoring team

In Jordan there are six juvenile facilities – five centres for boys and one for girls (see Table 5). The facilities are spread across Jordan – three in Central Jordan, two in the North and one in the South.

Name of centre	Location	Gender	Age range	Detention Stage
Amman centre for juveniles	Amman (Central)	Male	12-16	Pre-trial detention only
Russeifa juvenile centre	Russeifa Central	Male	16-18	Pre-trial detention only
Juvenile girls centre	Amman Central	Female	12-18	Pre- and post-trial detention
Irbid juvenile centre	Irbid (North)	Male	12-16	Pre- and post-trial detention
Irbid juvenile centre	Irbid (North)	Male	16-18	Pre- and post-trial detention
Ma'an Juvenile centre	Ma'an (South)	Male	12-18	Pre- and post-trial detention

Table 5: Juvenile Detention Facilities in Jordan

At the beginning of the project (2011), Jordan had three different bodies responsible for monitoring the treatment of children in detention facilities: the judiciary, the Ministry of Social Development, and the National Centre for Human Rights which is an accredited quasi-governmental National Human Rights Institute. See Box 3 over page for more information.

#### Box 3: National Level Juvenile Monitoring Mechanisms in Jordan

##### *Judicial monitoring*

The Attorney-General has the overall mandate to oversee prison and detention centres (PRI, 2011). Court judges are obliged to visit juvenile facilities 'at least one every three months' and their findings are not made public (Sheahan and Ratrot, 2011).

##### *Ministry of Social Development - Directorate of Social Defence*

The Directorate of Social Defence is responsible for the internal monitoring of juvenile facilities in Jordan. Directorate administrative staff carry out internal monitoring visits to inspect juvenile facilities and reports are sent to their line managers. Sheahan and Ratrot (2011) note that there is a lack of proper follow-up on recommendations.

##### *National Centre for Human Rights (NCHR)*

The NCHR was established in 2002 and become operational in 2003. The Centre is primarily funded by the state and has a specific mandate to visit the reform and rehabilitation centres, detention centres and shelters for juveniles in accordance with procedures. Reports of the visit are submitted in the first instance to the Director of the NCHR and subsequently submitted to the Prime Minister who in turn transmits them to relevant ministries (Sheahan and Ratrot, 2011).

Despite such monitoring mechanisms, Jordan lacked an independent monitoring body responsible for monitoring juvenile detention facilities in line with international standards. International standards are quite clear that independent inspections and monitoring of detention facilities by qualified bodies should take place on a regular basis, at times unannounced, with full access to the facilities, and freedom to interview children and staff in private (Sheahan and Ratrot, 2011; 12).

### Extent to which the outcome materialised

PRI successfully signed an agreement with the Ministry of Social Development to create a National Independent Team for monitoring care centres in Jordan. The independent monitoring team was officially launched on 9 March 2013. The team's mandate includes access to all care centres in Jordan, including those for juveniles, persons with disability, elderly and orphans. The team's jurisdiction allows for independent monitoring visits to all the juvenile centres presented in Table 5. The team's first monitoring visit was on 10 July 2013. In one three month period between 10 July 2013 and 10 October 2013, the team completed 26 monitoring visits to care centres, which is an average rate of 2.16 visits per week. To date, the team has visited three juvenile detention centres and plans to visit the remaining three by the end of 2013.

The project objective for independent monitoring focused on the creation of independent mechanisms to monitor juvenile facilities. As already established, in Jordan, this objective was most definitely achieved. At the beginning of the project, the creation of an independent monitoring mechanism in the project timeframe was an ambitious objective. The creation of the team in itself is therefore a major achievement.

In the project proposal, the project outcome focused on assisting Government and civil society organisations to implement the independent monitoring mechanism. This of course, assumed that the independent monitoring team would be created during the project period and that there would be time to focus on building the capacity of the team and to help them develop standards and procedures for monitoring. Because the team was launched in March 2013, the project did in fact have time to focus on implementation. To date, the following has been achieved:

- A monitoring checklist has been developed and piloted to structure and guide the monitoring visits. The team are currently piloting the checklist. The team plans to add additional checklist items to the guide (Interview with monitoring team member, 10 October 2013).
- PRI is working with the team to create an operational manual and a code of conduct. The operation manual will clarify the structure and reporting lines for the team.
- An independent monitoring workshop for the independent monitoring team members and JPD officers in March 2013 was an opportunity for participants to share knowledge and good practice on inspection and monitoring.

When asked about their achievements to date, the independent monitoring team member interviewed for this evaluation listed the following:

- 1) A strong relationship has been forged between the team and the Ministry of Social Development. There are plans to establish a new unit within the Ministry that will be a focal point for the team.
- 2) Based on our recommendations, two care centres for persons with disabilities have closed.
- 3) The new juvenile law will have a separate article on independent monitoring (Interview with independent monitoring team member, 10 October 2013).

It is clear that there is still much to do to develop the capacity and institutionalise the independent monitoring team so that it is a sustainable independent monitoring mechanism that complements and adds extra value to the existing monitoring mechanisms in Jordan. However, it has been an



excellent start. In a short three-month timeframe, the team has been established and has successfully completed 26 monitoring visits. Procedures and policies have been put in place, which will help to improve the performance of the team. Perhaps most importantly, the team has established a strong relationship with the Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry is acting on its recommendations.

### Causal explanation

The theory of change below (Figure 4) illustrates the causal processes that led to the creation of the independent monitoring team. The upper portion of the results chain focuses on the implementation of the monitoring mechanism which will lead to the long-term outcomes associated with increased transparency, accountability and the protection of the rights of children in detention facilities.




Figure 4: Independent Monitoring in Jordan Theory of Change



In May 2012, a BBC documentary, 'Jordan's Secret Shame', was aired in Jordan and showed shocking abuse of children with disabilities in Jordan's care centres. The documentary caused a public uproar and King Abdullah II visited the centres in question and ordered an urgent investigation. The Investigation Committee submitted its final report and revealed additional human rights abuses. Eight of Jordan's 54 private care centres faced allegations of abuse and three care centres for persons with disabilities were closed down (<http://www.jhr.ca/blog/2013/01/a-brave-young-journalists-in-jordan/>, Accessed 26 November 2013).

Prior and after the scandal, PRI worked with the Ministry of Social Development to create the concept of an independent monitoring mechanism in Jordan. In December 2012, an internal PRI communication had noted that the independent inspection team was becoming a reality in Jordan and that in the coming weeks PRI would start the selection of the members of the team in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Development (MENA report to PRI Executive Director, December 2012).

The care centre scandal created a surge of public support and political will to strengthen the monitoring of care centres in Jordan and therefore undoubtedly helped to pave the way for the creation of an independent monitoring mechanism in Jordan. Taking advantage of this increase in political will, PRI developed an agreement with the Ministry of Social Development for the creation of the independent monitoring team. The agreement clarified PRI and the Ministry's roles and responsibilities. The agreement also contained details on how the team would be financed and outlined a training schedule for the team. On the back of this agreement, in partnership with Change Academy (a local NGO), PRI advertised and recruited 29 members for the team, 22 of which have been actively involved in team activities. The independent monitoring team's first monitoring visit to a care centre took place on 10 July 2013 and it has subsequently carried out 26 monitoring visits.

As detailed in the previous section, once the team was created, the focus shifted to the creation of standards and policies for the team. To create such standards, the team drew on the experience of other national independent monitoring teams. With the support of civil society organisations such as PRI and Change Academy, the team is very much trying to raise awareness about its role and mission:

We are trying to raise awareness about the teams' mission and role within the care centres, the Ministry of Social Development and the community. We are trying to change the old style of monitoring and inspection in Jordan to a more positive approach that is based on learning and self-monitoring. (Interview with independent monitoring team member, 10 October 2013)

Indeed, during the evaluation interviews it became clear that the role and mission of the independent monitoring team is not clearly understood by those stakeholders that were not involved in its creation. For example, the UNICEF interviewee noted:

We recently had a meeting with the Ministry of Social Development and talked about the voluntary inspection team. They agreed it was not sustainable because (a) how do you select the volunteers and ensure they are independent and do not have a conflict of interest; (b) Jordan does not have a volunteering culture, I'm concerned there will be a high turnover of volunteers; (c) does the team have the authority to monitor? The facility may say 'who are you to monitor me'? Will the Government take the recommendations seriously? (Interview with UNICEF, 9 October)

The concerns raised by UNICEF are slightly unfair and show a lack of understanding about the team's mission, role and achievements to date. However, it does demonstrate the challenges ahead in terms of raising awareness, institutionalising and sustaining the team beyond the initial impetus provided by the care centre scandal.

At present, the culture of detention monitoring in Jordan is very much focused on inspection, policing and punishment. The team is trying to change this culture so that it is based on learning, trust and improvement. For example, to establish trust with the care centres and the Ministry, the team does not submit its findings to the media. Moreover, PRI's agreement with the Ministry stipulates that the Ministry has one month to read the reports and implement the recommendations. To see whether or not its recommendations have been acted upon and to monitor improvements in performance, the team often makes follow-up visits. The team is focused on educating, investing and improving the centres performance. This formative approach to monitoring complements the watchdog role of other monitoring bodies such as the National Centre for Human Rights. Changing the culture of monitoring in Jordan is a long-term outcome that will take time to achieve. However, there are small positive signs that this has started to happen:

The Minister of Social Development is very happy with the teams' reports. The Minister has asked PRI and Change Academy to train the Directorate of Social Defences' internal monitoring teams in the hope that they can replicate the quality, performance and approach of the independent monitoring team. (Change Academy, focus group discussion, 10 October 2013)

The next steps for the team and organisations such as PRI and Change Academy are to focus on the sustainability and the institutionalisation of the independent monitoring team. To do so, the focus group participants (10 October 2013) prioritised the following.

- 1) Raising awareness about the teams role and mission with the care centres, the Ministry of Social Development and the community.
- 2) Securing financial support for the team.
- 3) Recruiting new members for the team based on the established selection criterion
- 4) Improving the team's internal processes and procedures. We need to move from charity work to organised and well-structured work.

With the help of PRI and Change Academy, it is clear that to date the team has made some progress on all of the above areas. However, it is very much work in progress and the next couple of years will be critical in terms of establishing a clear role for the team that complements and adds value to existing monitoring mechanisms in Jordan.

### PRI's contribution

The previous section outlined the important role that PRI played in the creation of the independent monitoring mechanism. Indeed, before the care centre scandal happened, PRI was well on its way to creating the independent monitoring team. Even without the scandal, the evaluator is confident that a mechanism would have been created during the project timeframe. However, the scandal undoubtedly helped to speed up the process and the increased political will helped to secure a healthy relationship between the team and the Ministry of Social Development. PRI's agreement with the Ministry was critical for the creation of the team because it gave the team legitimacy and outlined the respective roles and responsibilities of PRI and the Ministry. The Ministry has recently informed PRI of its intention to renew the agreement for 2014 (Email from the Project Coordinator, 3 December 2013).

It should also be noted that Change Academy also played an important role in the creation and implementation of the inspection mechanism. Indeed, PRI and Change Academy have worked together on many of the capacity building activities. Table 6 outlines PRI's project activities on independent monitoring in Jordan.

<b>Activity</b>	<b>Outputs</b>	<b>Outcome</b>
PRI contracted a JJ expert to develop an inspection checklist to be used in Jordan, Egypt and Yemen (Oct 2011).	600 copies of the inspection checklist and a short guide explaining how to use it were printed. 200 copies were distributed to each country through meetings and workshops.	A user-friendly practical tool that gives more structure and guidance to the independent inspection team's visits. Contribution to Outcome 3 (adoption and implementation of standards for monitoring and inspection).
Training workshop on monitoring and inspection in places of detention (5-6 May 2012).	11 participants from the independent monitoring team and the Juvenile Police Department attended the workshop.	The participants shared their knowledge and experience of good practice in inspection monitoring which helped to increase the participants' knowledge and skills.
Revision meeting of the National Independent Inspection Team (24 July 2013).	Inspection team members attended the meeting to assess and finalise the first three field visits reports.	The visit reports were finalised and sent to the Ministry of Social Development on 25 July. One of the reports focused on a juvenile facility.
Roundtable on child protection policy, inspection kit and Code of Ethics for the Ministry of Social Development (16 Aug 2013).	15 participants, including juvenile facility directors, probation officers, social workers and inspection team members attended the workshop.	The workshop was an opportunity for the inspection team members to build a relationship, raise awareness and share their mission with key stakeholders

*Table 6: PRI's independent monitoring activities*

Overall, it is clear that PRI has made a significant contribution to the creation and implementation of an independent monitoring mechanism in Jordan. These achievements in such a short timeframe are impressive. However, PRI and other international and civil society organisations need to continue to support the independent monitoring team to ensure its sustainability and institutionalisation. PRI recently submitted a proposal to the European Union for a project to provide further support to the independent monitoring team. Hopefully, the proposal will be approved so that PRI's much needed support can continue.

## 5. Conclusion

The overall objective of this project was to strengthen juvenile justice mechanisms in Jordan, Egypt and Yemen based on international standards and guidelines to ensure that institutions dealing with children in conflict with the law are in line with restorative justice principles. This evaluation has focused on Jordan only.

This evaluation has established that the first project outcome – increased capacity and improved performance of the Juvenile Police Department – did materialise during the project period. Increased capacity and performance is an intangible outcome that is difficult to measure. It is therefore not possible to assess the extent to which this outcome was achieved. However, the key performance indicator relating to number of children diverted from court proceedings suggests that the Department has performed well and exceeded expectations since it was created in January 2012. An assessment of PRI's activities and interviews with key informants, most notably the Staff Colonel of the Department, suggests that PRI did make a significant contribution to develop the capacity of the Department. Other international actors such as UNICEF and UNODC also made a significant contribution to this outcome.

The second outcome focused on increased public and institutional awareness of alternatives to the deprivation of liberty for juveniles. It is difficult to establish the extent to which public awareness has increased on this area. Indeed, most of PRI's activities focused on the drafting the article on non-custodial alternatives in new juvenile law rather than on raising awareness. PRI made the right decision to switch the focus of project activities to the drafting of the new law. An analysis of PRI activities and interviews with key informants suggest that PRI created a space for juvenile justice stakeholders to analyse, discuss and contribute to the drafting of the alternatives section of the new law. PRI channelled this discussion into concrete recommendations that were submitted to the drafting committee. However, it is unclear to what extent these recommendations were taken up and reflected in the wording of this article in the draft law.

In the second year of the project, PRI focused on the third outcome – increased capacity and improved performance of the independent monitoring team. This evaluation has established that PRI was the main player involved in the creation of the independent monitoring team in Jordan. PRI negotiated an agreement with the Ministry of Social Development to establish the independent monitoring team and to clarify PRI's and the Ministry's roles and responsibilities. In partnership with a local human rights organisation – Change Academy – PRI worked with the independent monitoring team to establish procedures and policies that are in line with international standards. This included a checklist for monitoring, an operational manual and a code of conduct. All of these documents are work in progress and need to be finalised. However, it is clear that they have given more structure and guidance to the monitoring visits, which in turn have resulted in higher quality reports. Evidence so far suggests that the independent monitoring team is adding value and complementing the existing juvenile monitoring mechanisms in Jordan. However, much work needs to be done over the coming years to sustain and institutionalise the independent monitoring team.

This project has achieved some tangible outcomes that build upon previous juvenile justice projects. Each outcome area is at a critical stage. The Juvenile Police Department is growing and is trying to expand into other Districts of Jordan. The new juvenile law is currently being considered by Parliament; if approved, a system of non-custodial alternatives will need to be established. The independent monitoring team is established and is finding its feet. It is therefore important that PRI secures funding and creates new projects to continue its work to support the creation of a juvenile justice system in Jordan.

## 6. Lessons learnt and recommendations

### 6.1 Project Design and Monitoring

<b>Identifying a clear theory of change with robust indicators</b>	
<b>Lesson</b>	The project plan could have been stronger in terms of showing a clear theory of change and hierarchy of objectives. For example, the independent monitoring objective focused on supporting the creation of an independent monitoring mechanism and the outcome focused on the implementation. Implementation is a longer-term result that assumes the mechanism has been established within the project timeframe. It was therefore unclear whether PRI was focused on (a) the creation of the team; (b) supporting implementation; (c) both. A clear theory of change with robust indicators that align to the outcome statements would solve this problem.
<b>Recommendation</b>	When planning new projects, the PRI MENA region should map a theory of change for the project which shows a clear hierarchy and logic between the outcomes. For example, short, medium and long-term outcomes. The theory of change should be incorporated into the concept note and project proposal and should be used as a communication tool with donors and partners. Once the theory of change is agreed with all stakeholders, PRI should then formulate robust indicators that will enable PRI to collect data to evidence change.

<b>Systematic data collection to evidence change</b>	
<b>Lesson</b>	The evaluator relied on qualitative data through key informant interviews to evidence change. The evaluation would have been strengthened if monitoring data was available to show: (a) extent to which the outcome materialised; (b) PRI's contribution to the outcome. For example, diversion rates for the Juvenile Police Department; six-month follow up surveys to show increased levels of knowledge and skills; evidence that PRI's recommendations were taken up and reflected in the new juvenile law.
<b>Recommendation</b>	Once a project is approved, PRI should create a monitoring and evaluation plan that sets out the roles and responsibilities for data collection, data analysis, and evaluation. A simple monitoring system should then be set-up to ensure that data is systematically collected and stored to track the indicators. This will strengthen PRI's monitoring reports and will provide a stronger evidence base for PRI's work.

### 6.2 Juvenile Police Department

<b>Use a counterfactual to provide evidence to extend the Department's geographical scope</b>	
<b>Lesson</b>	The Juvenile Police Department is being piloted in the North Amman District. The performance of the Department will therefore be used to justify the expansion of the Department into other Districts of Jordan. Policy makers will be looking at the added value of the Department. For a pilot project such as this, a counterfactual should be established that helps answer the question: what would have happened if the Juvenile Police Department was not created. For example, comparing juvenile diversion rates in the North Amman District to other Districts in Jordan.

<b>Recommendation</b>	PRI should work with the Juvenile Police Department to establish a counterfactual. An obvious counterfactual is to compare diversion rates in North Amman with other Districts in Jordan. An interview with the Staff Colonel suggests that the Department is collecting data on diversion rates. The Department should work with PRI and the Ministry of Social Development to set a similar system up in other Districts of Jordan. This would provide the Department with evidence to convince policy makers and budget holders that their scope should be expanded into other Districts. PRI should look for opportunities to establish counterfactuals for other similar pilot projects.
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### 6.3 Juvenile Alternatives

<b>Create a project to support the establishment of community service pilots for juveniles</b>	
<b>Lesson</b>	Jordan is at an early stage of development when it comes to non-custodial alternatives for juveniles. Based on the learning of other PRI regions, if the law is approved, much work will need to be done to establish an alternatives system. For example, the new law makes provision for a community service mechanism. A community service scheme would need to be established.
<b>Recommendation</b>	When the new law is approved, PRI should develop some project applications that focus on the establishment of community service pilot schemes in Jordan. PRI is in a good position to work with the implementing agency to work on the practical technical issues associated with setting up the pilot. This would involve a combination of capacity building and the establishment of procedures, policies and tools to oversee the effective enforcement of a community service sanction. PRI should also continue to work on raising awareness of alternatives with the public, the judiciary and Government to help ensure that such pilots are used during sentencing and are sustainable.

### 6.4 Independent Monitoring

<b>Create a new project to support the independent monitoring team</b>	
<b>Lesson</b>	The independent monitoring team is at a critical stage of development. PRI is in a unique position to continue to support the independent monitoring team to help ensure that in the long term it is both sustainable and institutionalised.
<b>Recommendation</b>	<p>PRI should create a new project that focuses on providing support to the independent monitoring team. The project should systematically collect data to provide evidence of (a) the number of and extent to which recommendations are followed up and acted upon by Government; (b) how the implementation of these recommendations has led to the improved conditions of the juvenile centres and the protection of children's rights.</p> <p>PRI should work with the Ministry of Social Development to establish a counterfactual for the project. For example, using the number of recommendations that are followed up and implemented as the unit of measurement to compare its performance against other independent monitoring mechanisms in Jordan. This will provide PRI and the Ministry with the evidence they need to prove that independent monitoring works. This evidence can be used to set up an independent monitoring mechanism with a mandate to inspect places of detention for adults.</p>



## 7. References

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## Annex 1 – Timeline Matrix

Time	Key event	Juvenile Police Department (JPD)	Alternatives to Imprisonment	Independent Monitoring Body
Sept 2011	Start of project			
Oct 2011		A team of eight experts (over four months) worked to draft procedural guidelines (the 'Procedural Guide for Police Working with Juveniles') for the JPD. The Guide covers all stages that the police take when dealing with children through the entire criminal justice cycle.	On 11 October a series of meetings were held for all stakeholders working on JJ issues in Jordan. PRI drafted a framework – the 'Juvenile justice institutional network' – that should be mandated with following responsibilities: (1) planning for the JJ system; (2) improving the JJ system; (3) demonstrating evidence of the JJ system progress; (4) exchanging lessons learned; (5) action planning; (6) coordinating JJ projects; (7) supporting resource; mobilisation for JJ projects.	PRI contracted a JJ expert to develop and inspection checklist that can be used in Jordan, Egypt and Yemen. The list was developed through close consultation with PRI partners and local experts. A short guide explaining how to use the checklist was also developed.  600 copied were produced and 200 was distributed to each country through meetings and workshops.
Nov 2011		Training workshop for the JPD (20-24 Nov) on restorative justice. 32 participants of the Department (including social workers) were trained in a variety of topics, including: international standards, restorative justice approach and principles, the role of juvenile judges, the role of the police.		
Dec 2011		Training workshop on interview skills and conflict management (4-8 Dec). 25 participants from the JPD were trained in: interviewing skills for working with children in conflict with the law; conflict management and negotiation skills; mediation skills.		
April 2012			Research and drafting of a publication on Alternatives to Imprisonment in the Arab world. The research highlights a number of best practices from around	

Time	Key event	Juvenile Police Department (JPD)	Alternatives to Imprisonment	Independent Monitoring Body
			the world and provides recommendations on how three targeted countries (Jordan, Yemen and Egypt) can create their own Alternatives system. 500 copies of the publication were circulated within the MENA region.	
May 2012				<p>BBC documentary ('Jordan's Secret Shame') is aired in Jordan. The documentary shows shocking abuse of children with disabilities in Jordan's Care Centres.</p> <p>Jordan's King Abdullah II went to the centre and ordered an urgent investigation. Following the investigation, eight of Jordan's 54 private care homes now face allegations of abuse. Three centres were closed and several case workers are still under criminal investigation. The scandal paved the way for the establishment of an independent monitoring mechanism.</p>
June 2012		Four-day study tour visit to the Netherlands (25-29 June). 11 participants were introduced to the Dutch juvenile justice system and learnt about the different bodies that deal with children at the police and judicial level.		
Sep 2012	Year 2 of project			
Oct 2012			Workshop on alternative sanctions to imprisonment in Jordan (3-4 Oct) with participants from the media, rehabilitation centres, MOSD, and NGOs active in penal reform.	
Nov 2012		Second workshop on negotiation and conflict resolution skills. 26 participants – 7 judges, 2 prosecutors; 11 police officers; 5		

Time	Key event	Juvenile Police Department (JPD)	Alternatives to Imprisonment	Independent Monitoring Body
		social workers; 1 lawyer,		
Dec 2012				MENA December report to head office: "the independent inspection commission is becoming a reality in Jordan. In the coming weeks PRI will start the selection of the members of the commission in cooperation with the MoSD."
Jan 2013				
Feb 2013				The official launch and the first meeting of the 35 members of the independent inspection commission of care centres in Jordan.  A national meeting was organised on post-release programmes in Jordan between the orrectional and the Rehabilitation Centres and 49 NGOs from across Jordan. During the meeting, participants discussed the role of civil society in the Post Care Programs.
March 13				
April 2013				
May 2013				
June 2013			National training for juvenile judges about alternative measures and sanctions, 5-6 June 2013. 19 judges from the 12 governorates of Jordan (17 male and 2 female) attended.	Workshop on the skills of judicial monitoring and inspection of places of detention (5-6 May). 11 participants – legal researchers working at the inspection unit at the MoJ; officers working at JPD.
July 2013	Participation in an experts' meeting of the national strategy for penal reform in Jordan at the Ministry of Justice. The team has the mandate to present a five-years strategy (2013-18) to		PRI organised a review meeting of the new draft of the juvenile law on 8 July 2013. The meeting included the 11 national stakeholders involved in the drafting of the long awaited new law (since 2004).	First revision meeting of the National Independent Inspection Team meeting was held on 24 July 2013 to assess the previous visits and finalise the first three field reports that include juveniles in detention

<b>Time</b>	<b>Key event</b>	<b>Juvenile Police Department (JPD)</b>	<b>Alternatives to Imprisonment</b>	<b>Independent Monitoring Body</b>
	be adopted by the government			
Aug 2013			PRI organised the first Juvenile Justice conference in Jordan in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior/Juvenile Justice Directorate, Ministry of Justice, and Ministry of Social Development on 20-21 August. The event was opened by the Minister of Justice, and PRI officially launched the review of the draft of the juvenile law. 150 participants from all stakeholders in the kingdom attended.	Roundtable (16 Aug) on child protection policy documents, inspection kit and the code of ethics for the Ministry of Social Development (MOSD). 15 participants – JJ care centre directors; probation officers and social workers.
Sept 2013				
Oct 2013	Evaluation of the project			